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This thesis examines the survival of Cuban communism in tll.e post-Cold War era. 
The question addressed is: how viable is communism in Cuba now that communism in the 
former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe has failed? This thesis is a case study of 
communism in Cuba post-Cold War that looks comparatively at Poland and China. Four 
hypotheses are tested to isolate the variables leading to regime transition in Cuba. Four 
independent variables are tested: (1) regime legitimacy; (2) economic performance; (3) 
development of civil society and an autonomous political culture; and (4) United States 
foreign policy as an agent of regime change. 
This thesis concludes by addressing United States foreign policy as it relates to Cuba 
and by recommending a more open relationship that engages the current regime in Cuba. A 
policy of engagement in Cuba, much like the current United States policy with China, is a 
win-win strategy that would help oppositional forces in Cuba to find a public space, while 
denying the current regime a justification for its continuance. 
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This thesis examines Cuban communism in the post-Soviet Union era. The question 
addressed is: how viable is communism in Cuba now that communism in the former Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe has failed? In determining whether communism has failed or not, 
I define "failed" not by the quality of communism or how well it is working but by its 
existence as the sole economic and political system of government in a country. This study 
is significant because it is important to understand why some political systems fail and others 
succeed over time. Specifically, this study is important because it seeks to understand what 
the United States foreign policy should be vis-a-vis Cuba. Further, studying Cuban relations 
with the United States and Russia is useful so that intelligent predictions can be made about 
the future of socialism in Cuba. 
The methodology employed is a case study of Cuban communism that looks 
comparatively at Poland (where communism has failed) and China (where communism 
remains). Four independent variables are tested: (1) regime legitimacy; (2) economic 
performance; (3) development of civil society and an autonomous political culture; and ( 4) 
United States foreign policy as an agent of regime change. The hypotheses are as follows: 
(1) The greater the legitimacy ofthe regime, the greater the chance of regime survival; (2) 
the greater the ability of a regime to transform its economy, the greater the chance that the 
regime will survive; (3) the more developed the civil society and the more autonomous the 
political culture, the greater the likelihood that the civil society will oppose the regime; and 
(4) the more United States foreign policy (inadvertently) supports a communist regime, the 
xi 
greater the likelihood that communism will survive. 
The first chapter introduces the three countries, exploring th~ir relevant differences 
and similarities and establishing the basis for comparison. The second chapter tests the four 
independent variables in Poland and China to determine why communism has failed in the 
former but not the latter country. The third chapter tests the four independent variables in 
Cuba. The fourth chapter unites the findings from the two previous chapters comparatively 
to answer the central question of why communism remains in Cuba. 
The final chapter of this thesis provides conclusions, recommendations and analysis 
of the current U.S. policy to determine the best method to achieve regime change in Cuba. 
This thesis concludes that the Cuban regime maintains a certain amount of legitimacy with 
Cubans on the island, and is not in imminent danger of collapse. The economic changes in 
Cuba has allowed the regime to survive the fall of the Soviet Union and with it the ending of 
the economic subsidies. Rather than transforming the Cuban economy from one that is based 
upon state to market mechanism, the Cuban regime is doing what it must to survive, and 
increasingly, survival is its only discernible goal. 
Cuban civil society is underdeveloped, but changes are more promising now than ever 
before, given that the Catholic Church has begun to call for liberalization. With the elevation 
to cardinal ofHavana Archbishop Jaime Ortega in November 1994, the Catholic Church has 
taken on a more aggressive role in Cuban society and is attempting a slow, but steadfast 
resurgence on the island. 
Finally, after more than three decades of an economic embargo designed to destroy 
the Cuban economy and bring down the Castro regime, Castro still remains defiant. The 
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collapse of Cuba's traditional trading markets in the Eastern bloc significantly hurt the Cuban 
economy, but Castro is transforming it enough to keep it alive. The question remains as to 
how long. 
As long as the United States continues its current foreign policy of"squeeze," Castro 
will continue to be able to control civil society with his anti-American rhetoric and 
nationalism. The confrontation strategy he employs is only successful to the extent that 
United States policy allows it to be. The United States has nothing to lose and everything to 
gain from implementing a communication strategy. The most important thing for the United 
States to do is to stop playing to Castro's strengths and start playing to his weaknesses. Each 
new United States threat gives Castro another opportunity to wrap himself in the Cuban flag 
and appeal to Cubans to do the same in the name of country. Castro has played the 
confrontation game well. He may not know how to play the communication game. He is not 
accustomed to an informed population with detailed, up-to-date information on the benefits 
of liberal democracy and free-market economy. The sooner the United States shifts the game 
from one Castro plays so well - confrontation - to one he is unaccustomed to playing -
communication - the more effective the United States foreign policy in Cuba will be. 
Xlll 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The fall of the Berlin Wall was far-reaching. The countries in Ea,stern Europe are now 
transitioning from authoritarianism to democracy and from centrally planned to market 
economies. The international impact of the regime transformations is great. For Americans, 
the most obvious impact is the disappearance of the communist threat in Europe. With the 
collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the problem of communist 
expansion dissipates as does the once useful policy of containment. Because communism no 
longer needs containing, the United States policy and the Cold War conflict between the 
superpowers came to an end. These changes dramatically reshaped the international political 
environment and require new thinking in dealing with communism elsewhere. 
Cuba is in crisis to no small extent because of the changes in Eastern Europe and, 
more significantly, within the Soviet Union. The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe 
and its disintegration in the Soviet Union present Castro with his most serious threat since the 
1962 missile crisis. The removal from the socialist ranks of the Eastern European communist 
regimes leaves Cuba almost alone in the world, clutching a dying ideology, robbing the nation 
ofboth the critical reference group for its own political and economic system and a body of 
allies upon whose political and ideological support Castro had come to depend. His defiant 
vow of "socialism or death" may reflect his view of his only alternative. Unwittingly Castro 
stands on the sidelines of the vast transformations underway elsewhere, exerting his staying 
power and demonstrating to the world that Cuba is an exception. The sense of moral 
righteousness and the belief that history was on the Cuban side has, in the past, legitimized 
Castro's regime. But ideology and rhetoric alone may not be enough to sustain Castro 
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through these turbulent times. 
This thesis will examine Cuban communism in the post-Soviet Union era. The 
question to be answered is: how viable is communism in Cuba now that communism in the 
former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe has failed? In determining whether communism has 
failed or not, I define "failed" not by the quality of communism or how well it is working but 
by its existence as the sole economic and political system of government in a country. This 
study is significant because it is important to understand why some political systems fail and 
others succeed over time. Specifically, this study is significant because it seeks to understand 
what the United States foreign policy should be vis-a-vis Cuba. Further, studying Cuban 
relationships with the United States and Russia is useful so that intelligent predictions can be 
made about the future of socialism in Cuba. 
The methodology employed is a case study of Cuban communism that looks 
comparatively at Poland (where communism has failed) and China (where communism 
survives). Four independent variables will be tested: (1) regime legitimacy; (2) economic 
performance; (3) development of civil society and an autonomous political culture; and (4) 
United States foreign policy as an agent of regime change. The hypotheses are as follows: 
(I) The greater the legitimacy of the regime, the greater the chance of regime survival; (2) 
the greater the ability of a regime to transform its economy, the greater the chance that the 
regime will survive; (3) the more developed the civil society and the more autonomous the 
political culture, the greater the likelihood that civil society will oppose the regime; and ( 4) 
the more United States foreign policy (inadvertently) supports a communist regime, the 
greater the likelihood that communism will survive. 
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This work is a case study of communism in Cuba that seeks to understand why 
communism remains entrenched in Cuba. To that end, this study comparatively exams Poland 
where communism has failed and China where communism survives, albeit in a different form. 
The second chapter tests the four independent variables in Poland and China to determine 
why communism has failed in the former but not the latter. The third chapter tests the four 
independent variables in Cuba. The final chapter unites the findings from the two previous 
chapters comparatively to answer the central question of why communism remains in Cuba. 
The first hypothesis deals with regime legitimacy. The central argument for this 
hypothesis is that if a regime is viewed as legitimate by the people, then the regime has a 
greater chance of survival. Specifically, the first hypothesis is: the greater the legitimacy of 
the regime, the greater the chance of regime survival. For clarity, legitimacy refers to the 
belief amongst a substantial number of citizens that in spite of shortcomings and failures of 
the regime, the existing political institutions are better than any others that might be 
established, and that they can therefore demand obedience. 1 
East Europeans did not voluntarily adopt socialism after careful examination of its 
possible advantages and pitfalls. Stalin imposed his communist vision on Eastern Europe with 
deadly force. This explains the thoroughness with which the bulk of Eastern Europe 
changed in less than a decade from the end of World War II until Stalin's death. It is the 
1Definition provided by Juan J. Linz, The Breakdown ofDemocratic Regimes: 
Crisis Breakdown & Reequilibration (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 
1978), 16. 
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communism of the Stalinist strain that could have created such havoc in such a short time. 2 
All governments, democratic or authoritarian, use some means to establish their 
legitimacy in the eyes of the population. No regime can last solely on the strength of its 
ability to employ threats, coercion or force against its people. In the communist party-states 
of Eastern Europe, political legitimacy was built on three main pillars: the communist 
ideology, widespread participation, and socioeconomic performance. 3 Initially, the 
communist governments were able to gain some political legitimacy with the people by 
encouraging popular involvement in the political process and because most of the countries 
experienced rapid economic growth which improved the standard of living, especially in the 
1960s and 1970s.4 Eventually, however, these early sources of legitimacy began to erode as 
people became wary of the omnipresent political slogans and the inability of the regime to live 
up to the basic ideals of communist ideology. 
An aim of this work is to try to understand the processes taking place in Eastern 
Europe, particularly in Poland, for the Polish case seems to be an especially good example of 
the broader trends occurring in previously communist societies. Nowhere else in Eastern 
Europe did a Communist regime have to contend with so many popular challenges to power 
sustained over so many years. In Poland, student protests in 1968 and again in 1976 
weakened the government's control before they finally collapsed. In 1988, two strike waves 
2David D. Mason, Revolution in East-Central Europe: The Rise and Fall of 




forced the regime to negotiate directly with the outlawed trade union Solidarity the following 
year. Unlike the party-state authorities in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, which were able to 
reequilibrate and restore order after a major crisis, successive Polish regimes failed to restore 
stability for any significant length of time following a crisis. Thus, for these reasons, Poland 
is, if not a unique case, at least a special case to study in Eastern Europe. 
In Eastern Europe, particularly in the Soviet Union, Stalin developed the "cult of 
personality," and for a short time his charisma unified the Soviet bloc. This short-lived 
period was soon replaced by Khrushchev's revelations about Stalin's murderous actions and 
his public denouncement of Stalin. This de-characterization of Stalin, among other things, 
led to a general de-legitimation of the Communist Party itself An analogous process 
occurred in China, but the effects were much more dramatic than in Eastern Europe. Mao 
Zedong had been a genuine charismatic leader who, in the minds of many Chinese, was 
deified. Therefore Mao's fall from grace was greater in scope than Stalin's. 5 The Chinese 
Communist revolution under Mao Zedong achieved a tremendous victory in conquering the 
Chinese Nationalists (Guomindang) and taking control of the fourth largest country in the 
world. Mao came to symbolize the Chinese revolution and until his death legitimized the 
Communist regime. 
In the Cuban case two points. apply. First, the distinctive traits of the Batista regime 
were such as to engender a significant national opposition to his regime, throwing radical 
revolutionaries into an alliance of convenience with more moderate opponents of the regime. 
5Tony Smith, Thinking Like a Communist: State and Legitimacy in the Soviet 
Union China and Cuba (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1987), 180. 
5 
Second, the characteristics of the Batista regime meant that the ruler and the military were 
increasingly isolated from civil society itself, and therefore had no taproots of support or 
legitimacy among any social classes or social institutions. When confronted with a growing 
revolutionary movement, the Batista regime could not mobilize social support (even 
international support) for its own continuity.6 
The Post-Cold War regime in Poland currently faces a similar challenge in maintaining 
popular support in the aftermath of the collapse of communism. One particular danger facing 
post-communist Poland is that hard liner elements from the old system can then take a chance 
and appeal to the public by reminding them about the good side of the old system while 
pointing to the current hardships- for example growing material inequalities- in the new 
order. This tactic can lead to frustration and to rejection of growth-inducing or 
transformation-instigating policies. In Poland one aspect worked to prevent this tactic from 
destroying the economic transition. The initial stages of economic growth or systemic 
transformations are often characterized by a surprisingly high tolerance toward inequalities. 
This is one ofthe most important features of a period called by Leszek Balcerowicz (Poland's 
first post-communist minister of finance) as "extraordinary."7 However, this extraordinary 
tolerance is temporary. Eventually the new system must fulfill social expectations, or the 
transition will fail. 
6Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America: A 
Comparative Study oflnsurgents and Regimes Since 1956 (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1992), 7. 
7Michael H. Bernhard, The Origins ofDemocratization in Poland: Workers 
Intellectuals and Oppositional Politics 1976-1980 (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1993), 33. 
6 
The phenomenal growth ofthe Chinese economy, if it can continue, may be the most 
important trend in the world for the next century. China has the fastes! growing economy in 
the world, displacing the United States which has, until recently, possessed the world's largest 
economy for more than a century. Yet there is still a significant possibility that China will 
never manage what economic historian Walt Rostow has called an economic "takeoff." The 
concept of a takeoff has been used to imply that development once started proceeds 
automatically along well-traveled routes until the country becomes a modem industrialized 
nation. In an authoritarian (or "nee-authoritarian") regime such as China, either poor 
economic performance or rapid economic growth can stir up popular dissatisfaction and 
resistance to the established power. Similarly, in a totalitarian regime such as Cuba, poor 
economic growth or rapid economic growth can lead to regime instability. 8 
The proximate cause of Cuba's current economic crisis is not hard to define. Cuba has 
a small and heavily trade-dependent economy. In the presence of the United States economic 
embargo, Cuba came to depend heavily on the former Soviet Union trade bloc, the Council 
for Mutual Economic Assistance (C:MEA), for over four-fifths of its imports. Without access 
to the United States market, with access to other markets restricted and with imports from 
the former CMEA countries significantly reduced, Cuba's economy and its people are 
struggling to survive. 
Although the level of economic development does not determine democratization, as 
8Malcolm Gillis and others, eds., Economics ofDevelopment 3d ed., (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company, 1992), 26. 
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both Samuel P. Huntington in The Third Wave9 and Larry Diamond, Juan Linz and Seymour 
Martin Lipset in Politics in Developing Countries10 have observed, comparative studies 
indicate that certain levels of economic development and democratization tend to run in 
parallel. If as posited by the aforementioned authors, a reasonably high level of economic 
development is a necessary condition for a stable democracy, then logically the converse is 
true. Economic stagnation and negative rates of growth impede the transition to stable 
democracy. In determining the effects of economic performance on regime transitions, this 
work will compare the economies of Poland and Cuba after the end of the Cold War and of 
China since 1978 when Deng Xiaoping began the "open door" reform program. The second 
hypothesis is as follows: the greater the ability of a regime to transform or "marketize" its 
economy, the greater the likelihood that communism will survive. 
The criteria for understanding civil society and culture is less defined than the 
economic conditions previously explored. Civil society constitutes the sphere of autonomy 
from which political forces representing a myriad of interests in society have contested state 
power. Civil society is a necessary condition for the existence of representative forms of 
government, including democracy. In Poland, the reconstitution of civil society was the first 
step in curtailing the autonomy of the party-state from society and in creating representative 
9Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth 
Centu:ry (London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 59-72. 
1~arry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds. Politics in 
Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy 2d ed., (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1995), 21-27. 
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forms of authority dependent on societal consent. 11 
A capitalist system produces a civil society centered on the market. Market factors 
mean that citizens can obtain political influence by buying their way into the public sphere. 
The public sphere in capitalist society is thus limited by the market because not all citizens 
have an equal opportunity to participate, regardless of the force of their ideas. 12 A state 
socialist system produces a civil society centered on the state. Instead of the market's 
selecting which voices are heard in the public sphere, the party decides. With social groups 
forbidden from articulating their own particular interests, the state mobilizes civil society and 
smothers the right of free discussion. 13 Thus market and statist principles both appear as 
constraints on public freedom. From this reasoning comes the idea of a "third road" - a civil 
society based neither on the state nor on the marketplace, but on a vibrant political public 
sphere itself This seems to be the theory underlying the post-1968 social movements of 
Eastern Europe, particularly Solidarity's practice in the early months of its existence. 14 
In China during the post-Mao period, the Chinese people experienced the 
reestablishment of the power ofDeng Xiaoping, and new values began to take shape as the 
open-door policy and the emerging market economy took center stage. This was particularly 
the case amongst the younger generation who grew up during the post-Mao era and knew 
11Bernhard, 2. 
12David Ost, Solidarity and the Politics of Anti-Politics: Otiposition and Reform in 





little or nothing of the bitterness of the Cultural Revolution. In fact, this generation 
experienced the cultural diversities of a society in transition simultaneously exposed to the old 
traditions and Western culture. Individualism and not the traditional selflessness of the past 
became the hallmark of this new, free market-economy generation which was to pose a frontal 
challenge to the legitimacy and authority of the state in 1989. 
The early years of a revolution are the years to implement the greatest change with 
the least amount of resistance as the legitimacy of the regime fosters euphoria and unity 
amongst the populace. At the core of the ideology of the Cuban Revolution lie two 
intertwining themes: the theme of lucha, or struggle, and the theme of utopia, or the 
millennium.15 Struggle has been central to the revolutionary creed since Castro took up arms 
against Batista in the late 1950s. And the Cuban people have continually been asked to 
continue the struggle against neocolonialism, imperialism and capitalism. Over the years the 
targets may have changed, but the tactics remain virtually the same. And lucha continues for 
the Cuban people. 
The millennium is the complement of lucha. The persons, conditions, problems and 
attitudes that Cubans are called on to struggle against are the very factors that impede the 
coming of the political kingdom. The millennia! vision justifies the hardships of the moment, 
for the political kingdom is not easily won. Translation: many must suffer and some must die 
before the promised land is reached. 16 To achieve the promised utopian society, the 
15Richard R. Fagan, The Transformation ofPolitical Culture in Cuba (Stanford 
University Press: Stanford, California, 1969), 11. 
16Ibid., 12. 
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leadership must give a universality and an almost spiritual quality to the day-to-day affairs of 
the Cuban man and woman. The message is that "these are not ordinary times, but ultimately 
the joy of victory will follow if we struggle for a while now."17 Essentially this is the hope 
upon which the Cuban people have been forced to hang their hats for the last 3 7 years. 
At this point it is important to define the concept of political culture. While 
recognizing the importance of the work of Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba in The Civic 
Culture, 18 this work rejects its assumption that models drawn from the United States or Great 
Britain can be imposed on other cultures with dissimilar histories and experiences. Instead 
this work takes the definition posited by Archie Brown and Jack Gray in Political Culture and 
Political Change in Communist States19 defining 'political culture' as a subjective perception 
of history and politics, the fundamental beliefs and values, the foci of identification and 
loyalty, and the political knowledge and experience of a nation and its people. Finally, in 
describing civil society, this work takes the definition posited by Alfred Stepan in Rethinking 
Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone which describes "civil society" as that arena 
where manifold social movements (such as neighborhood associations, women's groups, 
religious groupings and intellectual currents) and civic organizations from all classes associate 
17Ibid., 12. 
18Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and 
Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 1-9. 
19 Archie Brown and Jack Gray, eds., Political Culture and Political Change in 
Communist States (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1977), 2-10. 
11 
so that they can express themselves and advance their interests. 20 The third hypothesis guiding 
this work is as follows: the more developed the civil society and the more autonomous the 
political culture, the greater the likelihood that the civil society will oppose the regime. 
The final hypothesis to be tested is: The more United States foreign policy 
(inadvertently) supports a communist regime, the greater the likelihood that communism will 
survive. Specifically, this works seeks to understand how and to what extent U.S. foreign 
policy acts as an agent of regime transition. A significant dimension that facilitated the series 
of changes taking place in Poland at the end of the Cold War was the contribution of the 
West, particularly the United States. The mere existence of Western Europe and the United 
States gave Eastern European people hope that they would enjoy independence and liberties. 21 
Since World War IT three basic factors have shaped U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe in 
particular and Poland in general: the critical position of Eastern Europe in the global 
superpower confrontation, including its direct relationship to the security and political 
orientation of Western Europe; the influence of organized ethnic groups representing 
immigrants and their descendants from Eastern Europe; and the idealistic pursuit of the 
universal desiderata of national self-determination and respect for human rights, it being 
especially painful to see those principles violated among peoples so akin to Americans. 22 The 
20Al:fred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 3-4. 
21Robert F. Byrnes, U.S. Policy Toward Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 10. 
22Lincoln Gerson, Eroding Empire: Western Relations with Eastern Europe 
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987), 67. 
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first and by far the most important factor listed remains central to U.S. foreign policy 
concerns in post-Cold War, but the second and third have often bee.n decisive on specific 
issues over a broader spectrum of policy. 
The Tiananmen Square massacre, the collapse of the communist world, the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union, the emergence of new states from the territories of the former Soviet 
Union, and the end of the Cold War have undermined any consensus among American policy 
makers as to what extent the United States can maintain a close relationship with the People's 
Republic of China (PRC). 23 The United States has a growing trade deficit with the PRC. The 
two sides also have differing opinions with regard to Chinese arms sales and human rights 
policies. At the same time the PRC will continue to be a regional power capable of playing 
a global role in the future. The PRC can still influence North Korea. China's seat on the UN 
Security Council allows it to block or facilitate any UN response to a crisis.24 For all these 
reasons, it is in the United States interest not to isolate, but to engage China. 
The emergence of the United States as one of the world's two superpowers after 1945 
brought with it the tendency to look at events everywhere as part of the continuing struggle 
with the Soviet Union. At the height of the Cold War in the 1950s the intuitive response of 
the United States government to revolutions, changes in governments and shifts in 
international alignments was to calculate their impact on the Soviet-American balance. 
23 Alexei D. Voskressenski, ''New Dimensions in the Post-Cold War Russian-PRe-
American Relationship," Issues and Studies: A Journal of Chinese Studies and 
International Affairs, 31, no. 2 (February 1995): 49. 
24Ibid., 50. 
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Events were not neutral. They benefitted either the United States or the Soviet Union. 25 In 
such a world, there were no shades of grey or countries left unaffected by the contest between 
democracy and communism. 
The overall policy formulated by the United States to deal with the communist threat 
was containment. By restricting communist, and particularly Soviet expansion, the United 
States and its allies hoped not only to defend the free world but also to convince the 
aggressors that since they could not succeed, their only alternative was to cooperate. Initially 
designed in 194 7 for application in Europe, by 1960 containment had become a global policy, 
guiding United States reactions to events in the Third World. 26 It is in this framework that 
Cuba became a Cold War pawn. The United States' obsession with Cuba- prior to the 
collapse of the Soviet Union- may constitute what Jorge Dominguez labels "Cubaphobia," 
an exaggerated fear both of Cuba's potential for spreading revolution and of its ties to the 
Soviet Union. 27 
25Harold Molineu, United States Policy Toward Latin America: From Regionalism 
to Globalism (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 167. 
261bid., 168. 
27 Abraham F. Lowenthal and Gregory F. Treverton, eds., Latin America in a New 
World (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994) 209-214. 
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ll. THE COMMUNIST EXPERIENCE 
A. POLAND 
1. Regime Legitimacy 
The objective of this section is to understand to what degree Polish people viewed 
the communist regime as legitimate. Specifically, this section tests the first hypothesis: the 
greater the legitimacy of the regime, the greater the chance of regime survival. Particular 
attention is paid to the Stalinist period when the communist regime attempted to 
fundamentally transform the social, economic and political institutions in Poland. 
To understand recent developments it is necessary to recall earlier social and political 
transformations. The first and the most basic was completed by the early 1950s during what 
is called the 'Stalinist period.' Under Stalinism Poland was transformed from a traditional 
society to a mass society based upon a totalitarian theoretical framework. This work accepts 
the definition posited by Wlodzimierz Wesolowski in "Transition from Authoritarianism to 
Democracy." He defines totalitarianism as an economic, social and political system 
extending the principles of authoritarian rule into all spheres of life. It depends on detailed 
penetration and complete subjugation of all spheres of life by the central system of 
government, which shapes them according to a global plan. Totalitarian systems are 
characterized by an all-engulfing ideology, a hierarchy of powers managing the society, a 
mass party which aims to indoctrinate and mobilize and a political police with unlimited 
prerogatives. Further, totalitarian systems seek to dissolve all social structures and bonds 
existing prior to their introduction. They also aim at the captivation of minds, which would 
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make individuals prone to control and manipulation from outside. 28 
Because totalitarianism was imposed upon Poland by the Sovie.t army, that system of 
rule could never be completely assimilated and was not legitimate. At the very least, no 
government can survive without a basic belief amongst the populace that in spite of 
shortcomings and failures, the existing political institutions are better than any others that 
might be established, and that they therefore can demand obedience. 29 Clearly, the resistance 
of the Polish people demonstrated their unbelief in the political system. Three significant 
trends that reveal Poland's rejection of the totalitarian pattern were (1) the resistance of the 
Catholic church, which retained its integrity and autonomy; (2) the resistance of farmers, who 
did not enter into the agrarian cooperatives; and (3) the survival of some intellectual circles 
which rejected the communist ideology and kept alive democratic ideals. 30 
In all three countries that will be discussed here, the revolutionary elites who seized 
power attempted, with varying degrees of success, to use ideology to justify both the seizure 
of power and the policies to transform society. In the case ofPoland, the ideology employed 
to legitimize rule was Marxism-Leninism. While the Stalinist regime in Poland commanded 
sufficient obedience to maintain itself in power and to carry out its policies of social 
transformation, it did not manage to convince the masses of the true efficacy of Marxism-
Leninism. Obedience out of belief in the ideology did not take root. One reason is that many 
28Wlodzimierz Wesolowski, "Transition from Authoritarianism to Democracy," 




complied out of fear of retribution. Others obeyed in order to improve their standard of living 
or social status. Still others saw their original enthusiasm for the stated aims of the regime 
betrayed by its failure to live up to its promises and by the means by which it pursued those 
aims.31 Thus, Polish Stalinism had been forced upon the will of the society. Mass obedience 
was contingent on the perpetuation of coercion and the continued ability of the regime to 
provide material gains32. 
When the regime stopped using terror and coercion to deliver on its promises, Poles 
not only stopped obeying, they also began resisting. When terror was relaxed following the 
death of Stalin, elites began to organize and speak out publicly against the system. The 
working class demonstrated over the poor standards of living, and the peasants rejected the 
regime's agricultural program. All three of these actions significantly demonstrate the Poles' 
rejection ofMarxism-Leninism. Marxism-Leninism as the dominant ideology did not become 
legitimate in Polish society. The absence of another more compelling reason to give 
obedience to the regime explains why communism failed in Poland. 
2. Economic Transformation 
This section attempts to determine to what degree the communists were able to 
transform the state-run centrally planned economy in Poland. The second hypothesis to be 
tested is: the greater the ability of a regime to transform its economy, the greater the chance 
that the regime will survive. 




After worker protests in 1970, the new Edward Gierek regime attempted to "jump-start" the 
economy by upgrading the technology of Polish industry, but without a change in the 
economic system. The main idea was to stimulate new exports by importing modem 
technology, while remaining squarely within the socialist economic framework. 33 Between 
1970 and 1977, Poland borrowed approximately $20 billion from the Western governments 
and banks. The idea was simple: Poland did not need to change the economic system, but 
to use better machinery. 34 
Two features of the reforms ultimately doomed them. First, the communist reformers 
did not institute measures that would encourage competition, so that decentralization did not 
lead to functioning markets. Prices remained controlled; entry by new firms into existing 
markets was discouraged; and international trade remained restricted so that the international 
market provided no real competition for domestic producers. In short, despite being given 
more freedom of maneuver, existing state enterprises were never put to the market test. 
Second, the communist reformers had no interest in privatizing industry so that enormous 
inefficiencies that came from the lack of proper ownership of the enterprises continued to 
plague the system. They failed to realize that the "insiders" of the enterprises, the 
management and workers, could seriously distort enterprise behavior to their own 
advantage. 35 
33Jeffrey Sachs, Poland's Jump to the Market Economy (Cambridge, 




When the commands, and the threat of force, were removed in the enterprise reforms 
in the second half of the 1980s, managers and workers attempted to increase their incomes 
at the expense of the state by absorbing whatever income flow and whatever assets they could 
from state enterprises. 36 After the enterprises were granted autonomy in 1987 and as an 
attempt to mollify a bitter population, a small measure of worker self-management was 
introduced into the enterprises. In a sense, this can be thought of as the communist regime's 
response to the public's growing demands for political representation: no free elections, but 
a modest degree of worker representation. 37 
There were two ironic effects of this limited devolution of power to the plant level and 
to the workers. First, as decentralization progressed, workers gained enough influence to 
push for higher and higher wages. This contributed to an explosion of wages during 1987-89. 
The second effect was to instill in parts of the Solidarity movement a commitment to worker-
managed enterprises, which complicated the government's desire to convert firms into joint-
stock companies organized along Western lines. 38 
illtimately the failure of the communist piecemeal approach to reform was due to the 
government's unwillingness or inability to implement the kind of radical changed needed to 
create a competitive, private market economy. Such a transition was barred by ideology, by 
party elites desire to maintain power, by the distrust of the public who viewed the government 
36Ibid., 30. 
37Jeffrey Sachs and David Lipton, "Poland's Economic Reform," Foreign Affairs, 
69, no. 3 (Summer 1990): 50. 
38Ibid., 50. 
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as illegitimate and by the reluctance of the Western governments to fund the ad hoc reforms 
when what was needed was fundamental change. The communist regime's attempt at 
piecemeal reform failed to sufficiently transform the regime and contributed to the failure of 
communism in Poland. 
When the new Solidarity government began to define its strategy, its policy makers 
knew well the failure of piecemeal change. They recognized that thoroughgoing measures 
were needed, and they explicitly rejected the idea of experimenting with a "third way" 
between capitalism and state socialism, aiming instead to replicate the economic institutions 
ofWestem Europe. The basic economic questions facing Poland were not mainly about the 
desired ends of reform, but rather about the strategy for making the transition from state 
socialism to a market economy.39 
When Solidarity's Tadeusz Mazic became prime minister in September 1989, his new 
government was facing a financial crisis among the worst in the world - with inflation of about 
40 percent per month and widespread shortages of basic goods. The Polish public was 
thoroughly demoralized by a long-term crisis of economic decline that had lasted in acute 
form since the late 1970s. Under the leadership of Deputy Prime Minister Leszek 
Balcerowicz, the government fashioned a program of comprehensive and rapid change, aimed 
at ending hyperinflation and shortages and at creating a market economy as rapidly as 
possible. 40 Poland's economic strategy for a "leap to the market" also known as the 




prices and eliminate subsidies; establish a regime of free trade with the West; eliminate 
restrictions on the private sector; and privatize as soon as possible. 41 Emphasis was placed 
on implementing these measures rapidly in order to take advantage of the vital freedom of 
action made possible by high public trust and the shared sense of national emergency 
following the new government. The public expected strong measures and the government 
had the political space to implement the programs. 
How are they doing? Polish industrial production remains below its 1991 level but 
has begun to increase. Unemployment stands at almost 14 percent but growth in the private 
sector is beginning to lower that. Inflation has gone from 586 percent in 1990, when the 
reforms began, to an estimated 50 percent in 1992. Although the loss of the once assured 
Soviet and East European trade still hurts, Poland now exports to the West more than it 
imports. This reflects both the increasing marketability of Polish goods and the smaller 
market in Poland for Western foods as the zloty has fallen in value. 42 
The future of the Polish economy is still uncertain, yet the economic measure 
implemented have transformed the economy from one that is centrally-planned to one that is 
market-based. Although the economic statistics are still more negative in Poland than in 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary, the other developed post-Communist states, it appears that the 
bottom has been reached. 
411bid., 55. 
42Jane Leftwich Curry, "The Puzzle ofPoland," Current History, 91, no. 56 
(November 1992): 388. 
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3. Civil Society 
After World War II, with the defeat of the Nazis, the central issue was that civil 
society could not be organized until the question of who would control the postwar Polish 
state was answered. In the period from 1944 to 1968, with the exception of the Stalinist 
years between 1948 and 1954, the Polish opposition always had reason to believe that its 
political strategies might succeed in transforming the state or changing its policies. 43 It was 
when the system appeared to be incapable of reform that the state orientation was seen as 
hopeless. This juncture occurred in 1968, with the twin developments of the "march events" 
in Poland and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. At that point, the opposition needed 
to find a different orientation in order to avoid elimination. 44 
By 1949, the orthodox Marxist-Leninists of the Polish Workers Party (PPR) or the 
Polish communist party had destroyed both the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) and the Polish 
Socialist Party (PPS), made illegal all independent interest associations, and liquidated all 
independent organs of the political public sphere. The Stalinist years had begun in earnest. 
No opposition political parties existed, legally or illegally in Poland.45 The Stalinist period 
was the attempt to eliminate independent civil society completely, or to realize the Marxist-
Leninist assumption that state and society become reunited when the party of the "universal 
class" takes power. So the effort to "unify" state and society meant the destruction of all civil 





society by the state. 46 With civil society silenced by terror, there was no political opposition 
at all. 
But the Stalinist period could not last forever, for a number of reasons. The terror 
became harmful to the elite and dysfunctional to the economy, and the Party always comes 
up against the fact that although social divisions could be declared obsolete, they could not 
be made obsolete. Differences, in other words, persisted. 47 An example of the persistence 
of social divisions and the state's response to it can be seen in the 1955 de-collectivization of 
farmers in favor of establishing progressive cooperatives. 48 This meant that the Polish 
agricultural sector was dominated by a small-holding peasantry. The other area in which the 
Polish system was exceptional was the degree of autonomy granted the Catholic Church. 49 
Thus the Party was forced to vacillate between a strict totalitarian tendency with terror as a 
means of compliance and a reform tendency with interaction and concessions as a means to 
extinguish social pressures. 
As mentioned earlier, two developments in 1968 destroyed the opposition's 
orientation to state-sponsored democratic reform: the anti-Semitic "March events" in Poland, 
and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. By eradicating the Prague Spring, the crowning 
achievement of the regime, the invasion wiped out the belief in the ability of an East European 
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not undergo such reform itself The "March events," meanwhile, had earlier destroyed the 
belief in the willingness of any section of the Polish Party to carry out such a reform. 50 After 
the December 1970 brutal shootings by the police of workers who were returning to work 
after the strike was called off, the opposition determined that it could not negotiate with the 
government. This was a turning point as the opposition recognized the folly of reform and 
began to embrace a new strategy of democratization. 
The opposition strategy articulated in the 1970s proved to be extraordinarily 
successful, as it led directly to the rise of Solidarity. The essence of the program was that 
opposition practice had to focus only on rebuilding civil society. The goal was to transform 
society in a democratic direction, and not the state, which appeared to be incapable of 
reform. 51 
Most important, the goal of the opposition in the 1970s was to get the Polish people 
to do things - anything - just as long as they did it on their own, with no official mediation. 
Organizing, publicizing or attending a lecture series or discussion group, a theatrical work, 
or an art exhibit presented in a private apartment, basement or some other space not under 
state control; assisting people persecuted for political reasons - these were among the main 
forms of oppositional activity. For all these civic activities were felt to produce an ethos of 
self-determination, a beliefin one's own ability to act publicly. 52 The idea was to inspire new 





as equals on a variety of levels, and to encourage individual Poles to interact in a public 
sphere that has nothing to do with government. 
tr 
The first step in the self-liberation of civil society in Poland was the successful 
implementation of an oppositional, rather than a dissident, resistance strategy in response to 
the crushing of the strike movement of 1976. Opposition grew throughout the late 1970s, 
so that even prior to the strike wave in 1980, the struggle between the party-state and the 
opposition became the dominant axis of Polish political life. By the end of the 1970s, as a 
result of the proliferation of various organizations and movements and the broad 
dissemination of the underground press, the public space in Poland had been liberated and the 
actors therein were positioned as the potential basis for a reconstituted civil society. 53 
The third hypothesis is: the more developed the civil society and the more autonomous 
the political culture, the greater the likelihood that the civil society will oppose the regime. 
Thus the Polish civil society, developed and autonomous before the Stalinist takeover, was 
able to overcome the communist regime's attempt to destroy old vestiges of civil society in 
favor of a Marxist-Leninist state and society based upon the universal class. The communist 
effort to unify state and society by destroying the civil society failed as the Polish civil society 
opposed the regime. 
4. U.S. Foreign Policy 
The official United States foreign policy position toward Eastern Europe during 
World War II was that the disposition ofEastern European problems should await the peace 
53Bernhard, 10-11. 
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settlement. After the war, when the area became dominated by the Soviet Union, the 
American interest in Eastern Europe was overshadowed by the policy of containment. 
Containment was meant to halt further expansion of Communism, but by its nature it had only 
indirect bearing on areas already under Soviet domination. As a result, Soviet control of 
Eastern Europe was not seriously contested by the West during the period roughly from 1948 
to 1953, when the Eisenhower Administration enunciated its short-lived policy of 
liberalization. 54 Subsequent events increasingly demonstrated the lack of realism and purpose 
behind this policy, and it soon became an empty slogan as popular uprisings and the 
subsequent military responses ended the hope that American intervention would be 
forthcoming. 
It is in this setting that the United States developed the policy of peaceful engagement 
in Eastern Europe. Based on the premise that change in the Eastern Bloc could only come 
about through internal evolutionary processes, peaceful engagement was designed to affect 
both the regimes and the peoples, to stimulate diversity within the area, and to increase the 
chances of a higher degree of external independence. In a sense, peaceful engagement was 
a conceptualization of the post-1956 trend in American policy toward Poland and an 
argument for its enlargement. The long-range objective was a neutral belt of East European 
states enjoying a status comparable to that of Finland, that is, staying clear of Western 
alliances, displaying no hostility toward the Soviet Union, and possessing a genuine freedom 
54Zbigniew Brzezinski and William E. Griffith, "Peaceful Engagement in Eastern 
Europe," Foreign Affairs, 39, no. 2 (January 1961): 642. 
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of choice in domestic affairs. 55 
On political and moral grounds, the policy also combined a continued demand for 
national self-determination in Eastern Europe with an effort to promote the peaceful 
transformation of existing regimes from communist systems into democracies. In essence, 
the policy reflected American recognition that not much else was possible considering the 
East-West standoff, but most important, the policy reflected an American distinction between 
assistance to the Polish people and the Polish government. Throughout the East-West 
conflict United States foreign policy was geared toward the former and not the latter. 56 
The German question played an important part in the formulation of American policy 
toward Poland due the boundary issues between the two nations. It was in America's interest 
to diminish Poland's links with the Soviet Union while simultaneously attempting to reduce 
Polish fears of a German-inspired revision of the boundary at the Oder-Neisse frontier. To 
that end the United States used diplomatic measures to impress upon West German public 
opinion that the reunification of Germany would be impossible without major changes in 
Polish-Soviet relations. Specifically, American policy stressed that until German-Polish 
differences had been resolved, a completely united Europe was impossible, and the 
continuance of the differences would lead to unsatisfactory relations between Germany and 
its western neighbors, particularly the United States. 57 In encouraging Germany not to use 
55Piotr S. Wandycz, The United States and Poland (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1980), 374. 
56Ibid., 375. 
57Brzezinski and Griffith, 651. 
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force against Poland, the United States linked the security of Europe with the commitment 
of Germany to adopt a more flexible stance with regard to the GeJ:lllan-Polish territorial 
concern. 
U.S.-Poland relations were strained during the Vietnam War and following the U.S.-
backed failed invasion of Cuba (Bay of Pigs) and Cuban Missile Crisis, in which the Polish 
government aligned with the Soviet Union in support of Cuba. The most dramatic change 
in Polish-American relations took place under the Gierek Administration. The distinctly cold 
climate which prevailed in the later Gomulka years (1956-1970) gave way first to businesslike 
contacts and then to mutual efforts at cooperation. The United States' response to Poland's 
overtures was both positive and swift. Three successive American presidents visited Poland: 
Richard Nixon in May 1972; Gerald Ford in July 1975; and Jimmy Carter in 1977.58 
Nixon's visit to Warsaw, like his visit a few months earlier to China, signaled a new 
American effort to engage communist nations in the larger effort to contain the Soviet Union. 
The growing dependence of the Polish economy on economic cooperation with America 
provided a useful counterweight to the overriding Polish-Soviet economic links. Friendly 
political ties with the United States were seen as capable of providing a useful counterbalance 
to the unavoidable and necessary political links in the Polish-Soviet alliance. 59 In this way, 
Poland was able to take advantage of the East-West conflict and use its relationship with both 
superpowers to gain economic support for its economy and increase Polish security. 
Today, U.S. foreign policy aims vis-a-vis Poland remain fundamentally unchanged. 
58George Blazynski, Flashpoint Poland (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), 227. 
5~id., 229. 
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No other country among the prospective candidates for membership in NATO matches the 
potential strategic significance of Poland in terms of gee-strategic loc,ation, population and 
size. The collapse of the Soviet empire and Germany's reunification have placed Poland 
along the strategic periphery of western Europe and between Europe's two giants, Russia and 
Germany. 60 With a population of nearly forty million and a size roughly equal to that of 
Spain, Poland is the linchpin state of central Europe. If the continued revolutionary upheaval 
in Russia results in a fuller democratic government in Moscow, Poland will become a bridge 
between the West and the East. IfRussia repeats the cycle of authoritarianism and repression, 
Poland will become the critical buffer state for Germany and the West against the unstable 
East. Thus the United States support for NATO enlargement to include Polish membership 
demonstrates a recognition of the strategic importance of Poland and a willingness to support 
the Polish transition from a Warsaw Pact to a NATO member nation.61 
Following the Second World War, the U.S. policy of containment was reflected in 
NATO, which became the umbrella which provided protection for Western Europe from the 
Soviet threat and from which there emanates an attraction for the countries in Eastern Europe 
under Soviet control. Soviet control was so great in the early 1950s and information within 
Poland and the rest ofEastern Europe about developments in the rest of the world was so 
fragmentary that the Western Allies resorted to floating balloons into Eastern Europe, 
particularly in Poland, where mechanical or chemical devices loosed leaflets upon the isolated 
60Andrew S. Michta, "Poland and NATO: The Road Ahead," SAIS Review, 15, 
no. 2 (Summer-Fall1995): 137. 
611bid., 138. 
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peoples below.62 After a brief change in U.S. policy from containment to the liberation "of 
the captive peoples" of Eastern Europe during the Eisenhower administration (1952-1956) 
the main emphasis ofU.S. policy after 1956 reverted back to containment, upon strengthening 
the areas of the world most susceptible to communist pressure, upon persuading the 
communist rulers that the Western states would resist expansion, by war if necessary, but 
would not attack the communist states, and upon some effort to direct all of the energies of 
the communists and of the rest of the world toward a peaceful solution to the problems which 
threatened the peace of the world.63 
The death of Stalin in March 1953 set in motion a series of events in Soviet and world 
politics which helped lead to the abandonment of liberation, brought a new series of 
achievements to the policy of containment, and ultimately led to a serious crisis in world 
affairs at the close of 1956. These events ultimately led to the Polish revolt against the 
communists who abolished collectivization, gave new authority and power to the Catholic 
Church, tolerated criticism and expression of ideas which had previously been forbidden, and 
opened up contracts in trade and in cultural exchange with the West which made Poland the 
freest communist country in the world. 64 
The U.S. Government acted on the policy that it should provoke no crisis, but should 
work instead for gradual change within Poland and within the other communist countries in 





detennination, and it promoted contacts of all kinds between Western and Eastern European 
peoples by providing economic and cultural assistance. 
The fourth hypothesis tested was: the more U.S. foreign policy (inadvertently) 
supports a communist regime, the greater the likelihood that communism will survive. U.S. 
foreign policy has acted as an agent of regime transition in Poland. Currently the question of 
NATO membership is a central tenet of Polish security policy, and U.S. foreign policy 
initiatives stress that NATO expansion with the inclusion of Poland is a question of "not if, 
but when." 
B. CHINA 
1. Regime Legitimacy 
The uncertainty facing many Chinese after World War IT and the occupation by Japan, 
goes far to explain why, once the new regime was clearly in control, so many Chinese were 
willing and anxious to conform to the demand for participation in the new order. Historically, 
Chinese people have responded to the end of chaos and to the establishment of a new dynasty 
with a great commitment of order and industry;65 and given the truly monumental confusion 
of the preceding years and the general disorder of earlier decades, their craving for order 
allowed them to view the new communist rule as legitimate. Thus, the stage was set, both 
psychologically and politically, for an era of conformity and for widespread acceptance of the 
dictates of an acknowledged superior authority. The search for security and the need to 
escape from uncertainty, confusion and disorder provided strong reinforcements for the 
65Lucien W. Pye, China: Management of a Revolutionary Society ed. John M.H. 
Lindbeck (Seattle: University ofWashington Press, 1971), 18. 
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natural acceptance of the new regime. 66 
The Chinese people accepted their new roles as social and political participants. And 
the Chinese Communist leaders were ready to provide them with a variety of socially and 
politically acceptable vehicles for mass, but essentially limited and controlled, participation. 
During the consolidation phase (1949-1953), the Chinese Communists created organizations 
that reached every segment of the population and every area of the country.67 At the same 
time, the Chinese people quickly learned the style and the vocabulary of proper participation 
in all manner of new organizational contexts. Both teacher and student seemed to be well 
suited for the tidiness of obligatory participation. 
The Communist takeover and subsequent consolidation of the new regime in the early 
1950s shared many basic similarities with patterns of traditional China. Individuals were 
compelled to find their social identities in the context of associational relationships; much of 
society was organized into distinct groups which limited multiple membership and which were 
not truly voluntary in recruitment; and above all, government was untouched by anything 
resembling pressures from private groups and organizations. 68 An amazingly high level of 
participation produced, paradoxically, a docile population. Political sensitivity and awareness 
produced conformity and discipline, not autonomy and initiative. 69 






Chinese people were for the opportunity to demonstrate in public their readiness to identify 
with the new regime.7° For, at the time the Communists came to power, the Chinese people 
had an almost compulsory need to "participate." Further, the Chinese traditional reverence 
for order and conformity, and the similar fear of not being identified as a part of the group 
compelled the Chinese people to become more accepting of the new order taking place under 
the Communists. 
One critically important advantage that flowed from the popular mood and behavior 
of the Chinese was that their capacity for disciplined participation did provide legitimacy to 
the Communist regime. Regime legitimacy is critical to regime survival. The first hypothesis 
to be tested is: the greater the legitimacy of the regime, the greater the chance of regime 
survival. The readiness of the population to adhere to the new practices and to follow the 
leadership of the mass organizations implies that the Communist regime was accepted by the 
people as the rightful authority. 
2. Economic Transformation 
The earliest major institutional change in China was in the form of rural reform, 
initiated, in fact, by the peasantry itself. The leadership did not openly encourage the reform 
experiments until they began to significantly stimulate agricultural output. Gradually and 
without violent disruption, rural reform began to change the character of the economy. The 
peasantry, deprived of all economic freedom during the quarter century under the former 
supreme leader, Mao Zedong, regained it in some measure, and the free-market system began 
70Ibid., 19. 
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to be dominant in the rural economic sector. The results in the period from 1979 to 1990 
were a 6 percent average annual growth rate in agriculture and a 22 percent growth rate in 
rural industrial output. Because the peasantry is generally less educated than the urban 
population, and less mobilized politically, and because the regime has historically relied upon 
an urban support base, grounded in the public sector, this transition in the rural economy has 
been a substantial stimulus to economic modernization while posing no direct threat to the 
regime. 71 The second hypothesis to be tested is: the greater the ability of a regime to 
transform its economy, the greater the chance that the regime will survive. 
The most striking feature of China's economic reform, and the most troublesome for 
the regime, is the coexistence of two apparently irreversible tendencies: an unprecedented 
expansion of the private sector, both in the rural and (to a lesser degree) in the urban 
economies, and the rapid deterioration of the public sector. In the simultaneous quest for 
modernization and consolidation of its supremacy, the regime has been trying with great 
difficulty to balance these two goals, while keeping the public sector - the last socioeconomic 
bastion of authoritarian communism - in a privileged position. 72 
The process of the decentralization of power between the central and provincial 
governments meant that the local powers increasingly controlled the distribution of 
investment funding. The flow of power used to be wholly centralized, with all regional 
production going to the central government and then being redistributed according to a 
11Cheng Xiaonong, "Dilemmas ofEconomic Reform in China," World Affairs, 
154, no. 4 (Spring 1992): 155. 
72Ibid., 156. 
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central plan. 73 The reform, in contrast, created a contract system in which each province was 
obligated to produce a certain amount set by the central government, based on the region's 
previous economic performance. Local governments were allowed to invest any excess 
profits in infrastructure, public services, etc. Not surprisingly, this policy, begun in the early 
1980s, stimulated a dramatic increase in total production. This outcome in turn weakened 
the control of the central government, and the power of its economic plan began to rest more 
in the hands of the rural sectors greatly strengthening local powers. 
Most of the former socialist countries have adopted fundamental economic reform 
measures, including opening up their markets, removing restrictions on commodity prices and 
the use of production elements, limiting the money supply, privatizing state-owned firms and 
significantly changing the political, social and ideological structures. In mainland China, 
however, reform has been introduced at a slower step-by-step process. The private sector 
has been encouraged to marketize while the planned economy has been kept intact. 74 State-
owned enterprises which in the past formed the core of the planned economy have been 
transformed into a mixed economy. These efforts have been aimed at creating a "socialist 
market economy'' while, for the time being, avoiding the issue of enterprise property rights. 
The positive results of the new system are clear in three main aspects. The first aspect 
is the industrial growth rate, which has increased since 1979. For example, steel output in 




mainland China exceeded 43 million tons in 1984, compared to 25 million tons in 1977.75 
From 1953 to 1978, the average annual growth rate of Chinese industry was 6.1 percent; but 
from 1979 to 1988, it was 9.6 percent. From 1980 to 1986, the average annual growth rate 
of the world's gross national product (GNP) was 2.6 percent; the average annual GNP 
growth rate of developed countries was 2.3 percent; and mainland China's average annual 
GNP growth rate was 9.2 percent. On average, for the past fourteen years, mainland China's 
real GNP has grown 9 percent annually, and industrial output has increased by 20 percent. 
This means that mainland China's economic growth has been 6.5 percentage points faster than 
America's during the same fourteen year period. 76 Sustained growth of this kind is difficult, 
yet economists at the World Bank predict that by the year 20 10 mainland China will have the 
world's largest economy. 
3. Civil Society 
The events surrounding the Tiananmen Massacre of June 4, 1989 demonstrate the 
dominant themes of Chinese political culture, both in the students' drive to gain modernity 
and respectability in the eyes of the world, and the unaltered instincts of authoritarianism in 
the leadership. Thus to understand the Chinese political culture, this work will trace the 
events leading up to that confrontation in which idealistic students called for democracy in 
a society not yet ready to shed its authoritarian traditions. 
For clarity, this work defines political culture as a subjective perception of history and 
75Zhong Zhu Ding, "The Role of the State and the Planned-Market System in 
Mainland China," Issues and Studies, 30, no. 7 (July 1994): 75. 
76Ibid., 75. 
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politics,. the fundamental beliefs and values, the foci of identification and loyalty, and the 
political knowledge and experience of a nation and its people. Ci~l society is that arena 
where manifold social movements (such as neighborhood associations, women's groups, 
religious groupings and intellectual currents) and civic organizations from all classes associate 
so that they can express themselves and advance their interests. The third hypothesis to be 
tested is: the more developed the civil society and the more autonomous the political culture, 
the greater the likelihood that the civil society will oppose the regime. 
The story points to a host of relevant conclusions about Chinese political culture. 
These include such themes as the sensitivity of authority to matters of "face," the need for 
authority to claim omnipotence, the urge to monopolize virtue and to claim the high ground 
of morality, the drive to try to shame others, an obsession with revenge and the inability to 
compromise publicly, to name a few. 77 
The Tiananmen Massacre demonstrated some of the basic elements of Chinese 
political culture. The idealism of the student demonstrations was a reminder of the degree 
to which modem Chinese politics has been carried along more by hope than by actual 
accomplishment. It is a politics of becoming, not of being. 78 Chinese leaders and intellectuals 
concentrate on how wonderful the "New China" will be in the future, avoiding analyzing the 
problems of the present. Students of China are equally caught up in this spirit of hope for 
the future, so much so that wishful thinking replaces critical analysis. 
77Lucian W. Pye. "Tiananmen and Chinese Political Culture." Asian Survey, 30, 
no.4 (April 1990): 332. 
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The death ofHu Yaobang, respected for championing the reforms ofDeng Xiaoping, 
meant the loss of what the students proclaimed was their last hope of agood leader for China 
and was a trigger for their activism. The rule in China is that when the situation is hopeless, 
take hope. In fact, in Chinese political culture action in hopeless circumstances captures the 
spirit of the heroic, for the heroic is always flavored with a touch of the tragic. This 
connection between the heroic and the tragic repeatedly surfaced during the uprising. 79 
The lofty sentiments of the students' activities further escalated tensions when, at the 
memorial service for Hu's death, they publicly dramatized their unhappiness by holding 
written petitions above their heads while surrounded by other tearful students in an attempt 
to get state officials present at the memorial to meet with them. The state officials refused, 
and instead, police appeared directing the students back to their campuses. At this point and 
from the outside looking in, there was nothing for the students to do but to return to their 
normal lives. But in terms of what is important in Chinese political culture this was not 
possible. There was instead an inexorable movement toward confrontation, for in the eyes 
of the leaders the students had already gone too far. Therefore, the leaders had to take on the 
task that in Chinese political culture is a prime responsibility of government: teaching the 
lessons of correct behavior. 80 The students, in proclaiming their superior moral 
righteousness, had directly challenged the legitimacy of the leadership. In Chinese political 
culture this was a serious challenge because rulers in China are supposed to have the 





The state could not abide by such a challenge, and it decided that the students 
represented an evil, anti-socialist movement that threatened the sanctity of the party and the 
state. So the government ordered an official to produce an editorial for the main Chinese 
daily paper explicitly condemning the students in the strongest possible language as subversive 
and evil. The editorial elevated the students into a position of personal conflict with Deng 
Xiaoping. In Chinese political culture, public insults have to be redressed publicly, and since 
the editorial directly attacked the students, they were compelled to demand that the 
authorities "reverse the verdict" of the editorial. However, in calling for a "reversal of the 
verdict" all knowledgeable Chinese recognized that they were mocking Deng Xiaoping 
because in his return from disgrace after Mao's death he had made a major issue of"reversing 
the verdict" of the first Tiananmen incident. 81 Once again the students had responded to the 
state by escalating the tensions not only by embarrassing the country's top leader, but also by 
calling into question the legitimacy of the government. 
Thus the conflict with the state was fully engaged, and the students and the 
government acted in terms of three significant themes in Chinese political culture. First, their 
battle became one in which each tries to shame the other on the assumption that humiliation 
is an absolute weapon. Second, the students in particular, knowing that they were engaged 
in a conflict with a superior force, sought the rewards of heroic posturing, which they linked 
in the Chinese manner with tragedy and visions of death. Third, in the Chinese tradition of 
81Ibid., 339. 
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ascribing great power to the manipulation of symbols, they sought to tum politics into 
theater. 82 
Without reversing the verdict on the editorial, the government tried to tone down the 
rhetoric and dampen the damage caused by the confrontations with the students. Yet their 
decision to impose martial law shortly thereafter perhaps sent a mixed signal. Further, after 
the authorities gave the students a deadline to clear the square, the students responded by 
writing their "last wills" and swearing an oath to the progression of democracy in China. 83 
For the small period between the initial declaration of martial law until the massacre 
that ended the confrontation, the ultimate power of the government seemed in question. In 
some ways during that period, the students had "won" a kind of negative victory in that they 
had not been defeated, and therefore the government would have to accept more political 
liberties. The party leadership, by holding back its power of repression, seemed to be tacitly 
recognizing some merit to the students' demands and that once opened, the door to political 
liberalization could perhaps be controlled but never completely closed. Then came the brutal 
massacre on June 3-4, 1989, demonstrating once again that the "people's army" was, in fact, 
capable of doing harm to its own people. 
In terms of Chinese political culture, the following three points are relevant with 
respect to the tragedy of the massacre and its aftermath. First, the act was a gross violation 
ofthe basic principles of Confucianism that hold that a ruler should always be benevolent and 




deception in preparation for an attack against its own people. And third, there is in the 
aftermath the heightened importance of revenge, always a driving fore~ in Chinese politics. 84 
Despite the calamitous ending to the student protest movement in China, the 1989 
Tiananmen Massacre did demonstrate the potential for civil society in China to collectively 
form and act in opposition to the government. The means and stated goals of the students 
demonstrated a widespread desire for an autonomous civil society and some capacity to 
organize political organizations and associations separate from that of the state. Seen in this 
light, the crisis of 1989 indicated that the leadership was momentarily stalemated by the 
tensions created by the students and the corresponding dilemma about how to respond 
appropriately to the challenge. The crisis also highlighted a breakdown in the relationship 
between state and society. 
4. U.S. Foreign Policy 
The U.S. administration has a clear stake in its policy toward China. Further, this 
policy is broadly supported by the American business community, which is interested in 
maintaining a high level oftrade with the PRC. In this sense, a new consensus on U.S. policy 
toward China has been reached: not to ignore or isolate China but to support China's move 
toward economic freedom, hoping that this will lead to the introduction of political 
democracy there. 85 Most sanctions implemented against the PRC after the massacre have 
been lifted. The Bush administration found it necessary to use both the "carrot and stick" 
84Ibid., 345. 
85Kenneth Lieberthal, "A New China Strategy," Foreign Affairs, 74, no.6 
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approaches to achieve the desired results in its China policy. Likewise, the Clinton 
administration theoretically can still use the "war" between the White House and Congress 
as another lever to influence China, and congressional criticism can be used as a threat that 
most-favored-nation (MFN) status will not be resumed.86 Also with the end of the Cold War, 
U.S. foreign policy has been undergoing a radical restructuring. The PRC's strategic, 
regional and economic influence continues to grow, making U.S.-Chinese trade an 
"independent" factor in bilateral relations. The fourth hypothesis to be tested is: the more 
U.S. foreign policy (inadvertently) supports a communist regime, the greater the likelihood 
that communism will survive. 
A strong China will inevitably present major challenges to the United States and the 
rest of the international system. In the past, the rise of a country to great power status has 
always forced realignment of the international system and has more than once led to war. 
Thus one of America's most important diplomatic challenges, therefore, is to try to integrate 
China into Asia and the global political system. 87 A secure and cohesive China will feel less 
pressured to build up its military and demonstrate its toughness. It will not confront the 
world with large refugee flows and internal warfare, and it will not invite external intervention 
0 
because of political fragmentation. A reform-minded and modernizing China will continue 
to advance toward a market-driven system which will better meet the material needs of its 





requires a political system that is responsive enough to keep up with rapid social changes that 
will accompany reform and modernization. An open China will be mor,e prosperous, expose 
its citizens to international thinking and practices, and have strong incentives to participate 
constructively in the international system. 89 
The major pieces of this policy seemed largely in place at the onset of 1995: the 
United States had 'de-linked" from Beijing's human rights policies the annual recertification 
process for most-favored-nation (MFN) trading status for China; the military-to-military 
relationship had been reestablished after a post-Tiananmen hiatus; sanctions imposed on China 
for missile sales to Pakistan had been removed;90 and, at present, political relations appear to 
be progressing, albeit unevenly. 
Thus the current administration's foreign policy is engaging China's baseline 
"realpolitik" view as it seeks a friendly and constructive relationship with China free of human 
rights as a central issue. The United States has huge stakes in the political transitions of 
China and other East Asian nations. By remaining engaged in the region, particularly in 
China, the United States can improve the odds that the transitions will be toward stable 
democracy. 
89Ibid., 37. 
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A. REGIME LEGITIMACY 
The two previous chapters have argued that no government can survive without the 
belief on the part of a substantial number of the citizens and an even larger number of those 
in control of government that in spite of shortcomings and failures, the existing political 
institutions are better than any others that might be established, and that they can therefore 
demand obedience.91 The first hypothesis to be tested is: the greater the legitimacy of the 
regime, the greater the chance that the regime will survive. 
Whereas communism in Eastern Europe was imposed upon the people by the Soviet 
Union, communism in Cuba had came about through native forces uniting to rid the country 
of a dictator. Cuba had a revolutionary tradition that made the Revolution of 1959 possible. 
Political and social turmoil had engulfed the island since the middle of the nineteenth century. 
In the absence of stable political institutions, Cuba could rightly claim the right or rather the 
obligation to revolt to eliminate old grievances. In short, the Revolution of 1959 took place 
because non-revolutionary changes had failed. 92 
Initially lacking a well-defined ideology, Fidel Castro proclaimed that the overthrow 
of the repressive Fulgencio Batista regime was Cuba's sole, overriding task. After January 
1, 1959 when Castro's 26th of July Movement overthrew Batista and filled the power 
91Linz, 16. 
92Ramon E. Ruiz, Cuba: The Making of a Revolution (Massachusetts: The 
University ofMassachusetts Press, 1968), 123. 
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vacuum; Castro quickly began the rapid confiscation and redistribution phase of the 
Revolution, which lasted until the formal establishment of the socialist economy in April1961, 
when he proclaimed that the Revolution was socialist. 
The subsequent radicalization of the Revolution and the breakdown in the relations 
with the United States corresponds with the growing Cuban-Soviet rapprochement. In 1960 
the United States announced an economic embargo on most exports to Cuba, severed 
diplomatic relations and withdrew its ambassador, signaling an end to Cuba's economic and 
political dependence on the United States and the beginning of Cuba's dependence on the 
Soviet Union. 
The Cuban Revolution began in earnest with Fulgencio Batista's escape from Cuba 
in the early hours of January 1, 1959 and ended soon after Castro's assumption and 
consolidation of power, his declaration of allegiance to Marxism-Leninism and Cuba's full 
admission to the Soviet bloc. One of the most defining features of the Cuban Revolution at 
the time it came to power was that it did not have essential state structures - a party, a 
coherently articulated ideology or a significant army. From the time of Cuban independence, 
various forces conspired to undermine any coherent national ruling class form establishing 
itself and a state structure to serve it. The Revolution could take power essentially without 
a party structure, without an army, without an articulated ideology, in an extremely brief time 
period, precisely because there was no party structure, no strongly held ideology, no loyal 
army, and no powerful institutions that had to be countered or overthrown. 93 
93Carol Bengelsdorf, The Problem ofDemocracy in Cuba: Between Vision and 
Reality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 68. 
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A second consideration involves the primary factor influencing the Cuban 
revolutionary leadership from the beginning: the central importance.ofunity. In Castro's 
mind, unity was the indispensable element in forging a new Cuba able to withstand the 
enormous internal and external threats that would face the country in the aftermath of the 
victory of the Revolution94 The revolt against then president Fulgencio Batista, much like the 
1979 revolt that overthrew the long-standing dictatorship of Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua, 
was a nationalist effort that deposed a decadent and crumbling state structure that had 
maintained itselfby corruption and brute force. In Cuba, however, class war broke out in full 
intensity immediately with the revolutionaries' accession to power. And the opposing classes 
could find strong and active support in the United States. At the time of the Cuban 
Revolution's triumph, only five years had passed since the CIA openly sponsored and 
organized the overthrow of the legitimately elected socialist Jacobo Arbenz government in 
nearby Guatemala. 95 
Thus it was Fidel Castro's requirement for unity that kept him from calling a national 
plebiscite or national elections in the first years of the Revolution. By most estimates, even 
those of the CIA and the State Department, Castro would have won by an overwhelming 
victory in any such election.96 The most fundamental reason no such elections were held had 
to do precisely with this idea of unity. Jean Paul Sartre asked Castro about the question of 





hostile mouths that I don't understand why you should deprive yourself of it." Castro's 
answer was revealing: "For one single reason. We don't want to r,ay for triumph of the 
revolutionaries by wiping out the Revolution. What is the meaning of our group? The unity 
of views, practical union. At present, what would an elected assembly be? The mirror of our 
discord. "97 
The importance of unity can be seen in the strategic method with which Castro 
dismantled potential forces competing for power in the years immediately following Batista's 
departure. Essentially, what Castro did was to let each possible contending group play itself 
out and destroy itselfbefore he took a formal role in the new government. Those people who 
carried prestige and were remnants from the past represented the first threat to a unified 
Castro rule. Thus they were the first to be eliminated.98 
It is Fidel Castro, most fundamentally, who constitutes the center of the drive for unity 
and the symbol of that unity. Observers of the Cuban revolutionary process cannot ignore 
the centrality of the figure of Fidel Castro as the architect of the Revolution, particularly 
during the 1960s. Thus the overwhelming importance of Fidel Castro to the Revolution and 
the new government goes a long way toward explaining a state structure in Cuba in which the 
only institution of any permanence is Castro himself 
With Fidel Castro acting as "the institution" and with all decision making vested in 




democracy in action."99 This "direct democracy'' or what Che Guevara called the "dialectical 
unity between the individual and the mass," took essentially two form.s. The first was the 
huge rallies held in the Plaza of the Revolution during the first decade of the Revolution, at 
which Castro spoke, sometimes for hours, sometimes to literally millions of people. The 
second form was Castro's constant presence, his endless pilgrimages through the island, 
promoting the feeling that he was everywhere, dealing with sometimes the most trivial of 
individual or village problems.100 Encircling this energy, this level of communication and 
involvement that is Castro's "direct democracy" is an extreme and implanted paternalism. 
The phrase that visitors hear over and over again in Cuba among those discontent over 
something, "IfFidel only knew," gives a good indication ofthe level of popular internalization 
ofwhat can only be described as a deeply paternalistic structure. 101 
One of the most perplexing paradoxes of the post -Soviet Union era is that as 
international communism disintegrates and loses its claim to global supremacy, Cuba's 
communist regime shows signs of strain but no fundamental weaknesses. It endures despite 
the dramatic changes taking place in Eastern Europe and Russia. Although undeniably 
affected by the collapse of an order which it had willingly joined and from which it derived 





as the last bastion ofMarxism-Leninism. 102 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Cuban 
observers knowledgeable about the conditions that precipitate the do~all of a dictatorship, 
predicted that Castro's days were few. The regime's ability to endure the crisis points to its 
survivability and legitimacy with the Cuban people. The Cuban Revolution and the 
construction of socialism has been complex in Cuba, a country that has confronted these 
transformations from a relatively low level of development in most every respect. Perhaps 
one of the most relevant peculiarities of the Cuban case has been that Cuba has maintained 
a flexible and self-critical position, which has allowed for correction and innovative 
experimentation without abandoning its Socialist orientation. 103 
From this perspective, one test of the regime's ability to adjust to institutional strains 
came in a struggle between the Communist Party and the military. The 1990 execution of 
General Amaldo Ochoa, accused of drug smuggling and corruption, and of three other 
military officers in 1995 led to speculation about the dire consequences that surely would 
follow, with observers willing to place a specific time on the regime's collapse. 104 In fact, the 
crisis hardly affected the power of the Castro regime, and it did not have deleterious 
consequences either in the military or in the security apparatus. The demonstration effect of 
the executions themselves probably suppressed any real or potential conspiracy. 105 So far, 
102Juan M. del Aguila, "Why Communism Hangs on in Cuba," Global Affairs, 6, 
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it is clear that no major inter- or intra-elite factionalism threatens to rupture the regime. 
Factions at time overlap as well as compete with each other for resources and influence, 
meaning that the rules of the game are still observed. Through various techniques in political 
control, Castro is able to anticipate dangerous strains at the higher levels of the party and 
government and preempt their most ominous consequences. 106 Even with the changes in the 
international system after the collapse of the Soviet Union and Castro's responses to them, 
the state remains the principal source of employment and income for the officialdom, and 
Castro is the linchpin of that system. Few among the elite would contemplate leading a move 
toward something fundamentally different, something beset by uncertainties and personal 
risks. 107 
Those who look at the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe as a demonstration 
of what is to come wherever it remains elsewhere, fail to recognize that they are observing 
two differing phenomena. One important difference is that in Cuba, communism came 
through internal revolution and was not imposed by Soviet tanks. Also, many who objected 
to the regime were allowed to leave - thus letting some of the steam escape from the boiler -
another difference from Eastern Europe.108 
Further, the knowledge that the alternative to the current regime could well be the 
diametric opposite world view directed from :Miami may unnerve many Cubans on the island, 
especially the blacks who, rightly or wrongly, perceive the exile lobby in Florida as anti-black. 
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It is true that some 95 per cent of exiles are white, while now just over half the population on 
the island is black. 109 Crucially, the revolutionary government has been adept at binding its 
identity to a more enduring focus ofloyalty: Cuban nationhood. The Cuban Revolution was, 
above all, in its first critical years, more a nationalist than a Communist affair. Those who 
criticize the status quo are made to feel that they are not just opponents or dissidents but anti-
Cuban - disloyal not just to the regime but to the country. This is the precise reverse of the 
situation in Eastern Europe, where it was the resurgence of a sense of nationhood itself that 
helped to throw off the Communist yoke. 
B. ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION 
Two events that led to the end of the Soviet-Cuban partnership were the economic 
agreement ofDecember 31, 1990 between the two countries, and, following the failed military 
coup, Gorbachev' s announcement of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Cuba on 
September 12, 1991. The report by the Soviet minister of oil and gas in the mid-1990s that 
oil production would begin to fall rapidly in two years also signaled an end to the Soviet 
Union's ability to continue to supply 90 percent or more of Cuba's oil. The trading of oil and 
sugar was a crucial element of the Soviet-Cuban economic relationship in which Cuba 
sometimes paid more than the world market price for oil, but was receiving from the Soviet 
Union far more than the world market price for sugar. The crisis in the Soviet oil industry 
was a major catalyst that precipitated the review of Soviet aid to Cuba. 110 
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The new principle emerging from the review was mutual reciprocity. Exchanges were 
to follow world market prices and be denominated in dollars. The market, not ideology, 
would govern economic relations. The new arrangement freed the Soviet Union from the 
costly pressures of Cuban needs on the Soviet oil supply and reduced resource transfers to 
Cuba through subsidized prices, grants and deficit financing. Another benefit is that the new 
market arrangement would let Soviet planners know in market terms the cost of the Cuban 
tie.lll Clearly this new relationship disadvantaged the Cuban economy, disrupting an 
economic relationship based upon heavy Soviet subsidies and non-market transfers. 
The failed coup attempt of August 19, 1991 and Castro's belated public reaction to 
it resolved the remaining bilateral relationship between the two countries. The reversal of the 
fortunes of the old-guard leadership who favored the Castro regime was also telling. 
Although in his public statements regarding the coup, Castro did not take sides, his failure to 
support Gorbachev left open the possibility that he may have favored the coup.112 Further as 
many of Castro's supporters were no longer in the picture, the authoritarian nature of the 
Cuban regime became a legitimate reason to cut Soviet aid. 
These developments led to the second defining event, the announcement of a troop 
withdrawal from Cuba. Gorbachev unexpectedly announced on September 12, 1991, that 
Soviet troops would be withdrawn from Cuba, without previous consultation with Castro and 
without any concessions from the United States. The withdrawal was a staggering blow to 




the United States left Guantanamo Bay. 113 Coupled with the economic cutbacks, the 
announcement spelled the end of Cuba's status as a favored client of the_ Soviet Union. These 
actions allowed Gorbachev to both reduce Cuba's drain on the Soviet budget and to placate 
the United States as a highly valued political and prospective economic partner. 
The Soviet economic crisis was the definitive cause of Moscow's retreat from Cuba. 
The drop in Soviet oil output was a major factor. Yet even without the economic crisis, ideas 
like glasnost and perestroika had created social pressures in the legislature, the press and the 
public that accelerated the reversal of policy toward Cuba. Faced with such severe sacrifices 
at home, public officials and private opinion could no longer justify billions in foreign aid. 114 
The rapid deterioration of the Soviet economy hardened attitudes toward the massive 
subsidies going to maintain Cuba's needy economy. Finally, the fact that the Soviet Union 
was undergoing a regime change meant that the issue of Cuba got lost in the struggle over 
the future of the union. 
Apart from China, in 1989 Cuba's trade turnover with other socialist countries 
(Albania, North Korea, Mongolia, Vietnam, South Yemen, Yugoslavia) was $135 million, or 
1 percent of the total, and showed a declining trend; at its peak in 1980, commerce with these 
countries reached 1. 6 percent of total trade. 115 These countries cannot provide substitutes for 
most Eastern imports; they either are not in great need or lack resources to buy Cuban sugar 





turnover with China in 1988 was $402 million, a twofold increase over 1987, and rose to 
$472 million in 1989 and $500 million in 1990. In 1991 Cuba and Cllina signed a five-year 
trade agreement for $500 million annually, and in 1992, they signed another agreement for 
economic and commercial collaboration.116 With the disappearance of trade with the Eastern 
European countries, particularly the German Democratic Republic with whom Cuba's trade 
turnover reached $645 million in 1989, China is Cuba's second largest trading partner after 
the former Soviet Union. 117 
According to the trade agreement, Cuba mainly exports sugar, nickel, citrus and 
medical products to China. Chinese exports include food and fodder, textiles and clothing, 
raw materials, chemicals, machinery and road vehicles (bicycles). In addition, China is 
building bicycle plants in Cuba to help reduce fuel consumption. Yet the possibility of Cuba 
expanding trade with China beyond current levels is low for the following reasons: (1) China 
has a program to achieve self-sufficiency in sugar; (2) although China is the second most 
important importer of Cuban sugar, this is for political reasons, since the Chinese do not have 
a great craving for sugar; (3) most of China's trade is with Asia (70 percent exports and 60 
percent imports), and China could buy sugar from Thailand and Australia at much cheaper 
freight rates than from Cuba; ( 4) China cannot send Cuba the capital goods and most 
manufactures that were previously supplied by Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union -
furthermore, China has only enough oil for itself and cannot export any, nor can it provide aid 




China. In addition, there is a long history of quarrels between the two countries. 118 Thus the 
Sino-Cuban trade relations will continue to be small, consisting mostly of exchanges of sugar 
for rice and bicycles, and Cuba's search for trading partners continues. 
There seems to be a consensus among top Cuban government officials and academic 
economists that, in order to survive, Cuba must reintegrate itself in to the capitalist market. 
It must diversify exports, increase domestic efficiency, find a solution to the hard-currency 
debt, set a more realistic exchange rate and attract foreign capital. Expanding trade with 
market economies is severely limited by Cuba's significant hard-currency debt (which is not 
being serviced), the six-year deadlock in negotiations with lender nations, and the island's 
scarce international reserves and lack of external credit. 119 Major creditors include Spain, 
France, Canada, Italy, West Germany and Japan. Hence Cuba is caught in a cyclical pattern: 
Cuba wants to unblock stalled debts but cannot pay without fresh loans; in tum, the Paris 
Club refuses to extend new loans until Cuba starts repaying old ones. 
Another remedy to the hard currency problem was to open the country to foreign 
investments in joint ventures up to a maximum of 49 percent of the shares. In 1991 the 
Fourth Party Congress approved a resolution legitimizing what was being done informally and 
allowing various types of foreign investment such as joint ventures, cooperative production, 
marketing agreements and shared accounts. Foreign partners now are allowed to own a 
majority of shares in enterprises the government has given priority to (such as tourism - which 
accounts for more than half of all foreign investment), total or partial exemption on profit (as 
118Ibid., 200. 
119Ibid 200 ., . 
56 
much as ten years in tourism) and customs duties, freedom to hire foreign executives, free 
repatriation of profits and salaries of foreigners, state intervention to dismiss unruly or 
unproductive workers, a ban on strikes, low wages, special government services (legal, 
architectural) and accounting and management control by each party. 120 
As more information becomes known about the number of new investors, who they 
are and what business they are involved in and so forth, it becomes apparent that the current 
regime has placed most of its hope for recovery and growth in tourism. Indeed, tourism is 
attracting much of the attention from foreign investors; hotels are at 90 percent capacity and 
higher in Havana, V aradero, and Santiago de Cuba. The biggest investors in joint ventures 
with Cubanacan, one of Cuba's tourism agencies, are Spain, the Netherlands, Canada, 
Colombia, Germany, and Jamaica. 121 
After the Cuban regime legalized the possession of dollars by ordinary Cubans in 
1993, the dollar took hold as Cuba's second currency. Many on the island have come to 
depend on remittances from exiles abroad. These remittances are enormous. At a 
conservative estimate, exiles send at least $800 million a year to their relatives on the island. 
The sugar industry, which has been virtually in ruins since the Soviet Union abrogated sugar-
for-oil barter agreements, accounts for approximately $300 million in earnings. The largest 
single foreign investment in Cuba, the nickel mines under development by the Canadian 
corporation Sherritt International, had revenues of about $250 million in 1995, while the 
120Ibid., 202. 
121Pamela S. Falk, "Eyes on Cuba: U.S. Business and the Embargo," Foreign 
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gross receipts of the tourists sector were between $700 million and $1 billion. 122 
Externally, the biggest stumbling block to Cuba's integration into the world market 
is the United States and its 35-year old economic embargo. Currently the U.S. legislature has 
taken measures to tighten the embargo in an attempt to hasten the detrimental effects of 
Cuba's loss of trade partners. In the spring of 1990, a bill empowering the president to 
withhold federal assistance to countries that buy sugar from Cuba was passed by Congress 
and approved by the president. And, in the aftermath of the Cuban government's decision to 
shoot down an unarmed American civilian aircraft that had allegedly penetrated Cuban air 
space, the United States President approved on March 12, 1996 the Helms-Burton Bill 
(formally called the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Bill). The bill's provisions 
attempt, among other things, to promote third party enforcement of the current United States 
embargo against Cuba and to ensure that Russia's trade with Cuba is conducted strictly on 
market terms. 
Since the end of the Cold War, one major reform theme in Cuba has been an increase 
in the use of the market. The first, and perhaps most significant, move in this direction has 
been the de-penalization of the use of the dollar. This has essentially legalized much black 
market activity and also opened up another way for the state to resolve its foreign exchange 
problems by attempting to capture the dollar flow, including allowing Cubans to purchase 
foods in special dollar shops at inflated prices. 123 Another example of the de-penalization of 




the dollar is the loosening of restrictions on the dollar flows that can be sent by Cubans in 
Miami to Cubans on the island. However, in August 1994, the United States government, 
as part of a new initiative against Castro (The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992), prohibited all 
remittances from and nearly all travel by the United States and Cuban-American 
community. 124 The effect of this ban will be to make illegal family remittances through the 
United States in order to restore a substantial part of the flow. 
A second aspect of Cuba's crisis strategy is to enlist foreign capital to provide the 
expertise and the resources in order to promote hard currency earnings and to help ease 
Cuba's reintegration into the world market place. Cuba's 1982 foreign investment code has 
been made more liberal, permitting minority or majority foreign-ownership. Production 
sharing arrangements, whereby foreign companies provide inputs, technology, finance, 
marketing or packaging for an operation and receive a percentage of its revenues, have also 
been introduced. As ofJanuary 1992, there were some 60 joint venture or production sharing 
deals functioning. Most of the initial deals were in tourism, but during 1991 their scope 
broadened considerably, involving biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, nickel, oil, textiles, 
construction, sugar derivatives, transportation, cosmetics and food processing. 125 Some of 
the deals involve substantial investment; for example, Canada's Sherritt Gordon company is 
reported to have planned investments of $1.2 billion in the Cuban nickel industry. 126 
1241bid., 209. 
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Tourism has been the primary focus of the new joint ventures. The number of tourists 
visiting Cuba has grown steadily from 243,056 in 1985 to around 400,0QO in 1991. The gross 
revenue from the tourist trade in 1991 was approximately $300 million. Since foreign inputs 
needed to be purchased to service this sector and since profits were shared with Cuba's 
foreign partners, the net foreign exchange earned from this activity probably did not exceed 
$100 to $120 million. Every little bit helps, but to keep things in perspective, Cuba lost 
approximately $4 billion on imports from the former Soviet trade bloc (CMEA) between 1989 
and 1991. 127 
Interestingly, Cuban foreign trade with other countries is beginning to look more 
"normal" for a Caribbean country. Most Caribbean countries, after all, do not trade much 
with Romania, but they do trade with Canada. Also the Cuban regime's promotion ofthe 
tourist industry by means ofjoint ventures with foreign firms represents a double about-face: 
the welcome to tourism and the welcome to private foreign investment. Thus the net effect 
of these policy changes with regard to tourism and private foreign investment has been, again, 
to make Cuba's foreign policy more closely resemble that of a Caribbean country. 128 
The reforms are definite steps in the right direction, yet they will not in and of 
themselves alleviate Cuba's economic difficulties. A broader, more comprehensive 
commitment to a competitive internal market mechanism along with privatization of small-
and medium-sized activities is necessary to bring greater efficiency to Cuba's internal markets 
and to attract the foreign investment that Cuba so desperately needs in this post-CMEA 
127Ibid., 413. 
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world. Further, without new oil the aforementioned projects do not promise to bring in much 
more than a billion dollars in new revenue annually in the coming ~ears. The loss of the 
CMEA trade is four times this amount, and the reduction of Soviet oil deliveries along with 
the expected smaller sugar harvest, lower sugar prices and the tightening of the United States 
economic blockade darken the prospect for Cuba's reversal of its declining economic 
performance. 
The economic reforms in Cuba have transformed a centrally-planned economy heavily 
subsidized by the Soviet Union to one that is more responsive to market mechanism. The 
new emphasis on foreign investment and tourism, structural reforms in the operation of 
foreign trade, and the realization of the impossibility of central planning have combined to 
transform the nature of Cuba's economic mechanism. 129 The second hypothesis tested is: the 
greater the ability of a regime to transform its economy, the greater the chance that the regime 
will survive. 
C. CIVIL SOCIETY 
This section attempts to understand Cuban civil society before and after the Cuban 
Revolution to determine the potential for the formation of an opposition to the current 
regime. The hypothesis to be tested is: the more developed the civil society and the more 
autonomous the political culture, the greater the likelihood that the civil society will oppose 
the regime. Accepting Alfred Stepan's assertion that it is essentially civil society that 




oppose the current regime. 
Living under a totalitarian regime for more than a generation drains much of a 
society's rebellious energy. In Cuba, civil society never developed, so there is essentially 
nothing to be restored. In the true corporatist nature, only "official" groups and organizations 
are sanctioned by the state, itself a monolithic and ideological institution. Under these 
circumstances society becomes a passive agent, to be led in the direction desired by the 
regime. And yet, the belief that the state represents society is natural in a consolidated 
revolutionary system like Cuba's which assumes a unanimity of interests that is fictional. 
Over time this becomes part of the ruling myth. It is precisely this ideological stranglehold 
that screens new ideas out and preserves the false unity among the leader, the party, the state 
and the nation. 131 
Once the totalitarian state is consolidated it acquires its own properties. It absorbs 
society and remains independent of and unrestrained by it. Institutions and organizations 
serve to nourish the state, not to disperse its strengths. For the most part this is evident in 
Cuba where there are no significant groups active in the social milieu that could claim 
recognition. 132 In the absence of organizational pluralism or effective civil organizations that 
can function independently of state dominance, society is unable to fully express itself, much 
less accommodate to the changes that come with time. Rigidity and decay become the 
standard. In this type of atmosphere, the very idea of challenging the system and attempting 
to remove its leaders is probably alien to a society increasingly accustomed to little more than 
131del Aguila, 90. 
132Ibid., 90. 
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sheer survival. Consequently, life in Cuba is becoming nasty, brutish and short. No 
redemptive impulse, if felt, can be expressed effectively because the notion of radical new 
change is inconceivable, even if the dreariness of the present cries for new departures. 133 
Cuban communism has thoroughly decapitated those institutions - like universities -
that have defied central authority in other communist countries, and from where protest 
movements were launched. 134 The intellectuals at the universities, active against other 
dictatorships in the past, have been coopted institutionally and frightened into silence and 
passivity. The Cuban system places two choices before the academics. They can submit to 
state control in return for "official" support and privileges, or they can refuse and be 
marginalized, jailed or worse. Hence, Cuban universities once known for their rebellious 
students (like Castro), their political activism and zealous faculties, are now controlled 
institutions. The universities' inaction is further due to the fact that selection and performance 
are judged on political criteria. Their thorough de-politicization - in the sense that Marxism 
is the only acceptable doctrine - indicates that universities are not repositories of anti-system 
behavior. Nor are they likely to be agents of change. 135 Thus the unconventional, defiant 
behavior often expected of academia and intellectuals is silenced in Cuba, where there are few 
critical voices left. 
Neither are the churches actively pursuing avenues to move from communism to a less 





which many may well hunger. In this, Protestant sects as well as the Catholic Church have 
been forced to endorse the turgid claims of Liberation Theology, equating liberation with 
salvation. The revolution is for the poor, so it must be supported and its enterprise praised. 136 
In effect, the church has become subservient to the state. Thus a potential source of moral 
leadership to the Cuban masses instead preaches obedience breeding a sense of inertia and 
fatalism. 
A third source of potential anti-regime action is the human rights groups which are 
without any concrete social base because of fears that association would bring repression. 
The human rights' community finds itself under harassment and social ostracism. For 
example, Elizardo Sanchez, a human rights leader, was jailed because he called General 
Ochoa's execution in 1989 murder. Individual courage is coupled with organizational 
weaknesses, scarce resources and the hostile environment in Cuba. All of this works against 
the movement's expansion and ability to get a democratic message out to a society so 
controlled through propaganda. 
These elements, if mobilized, could move the masses, but other elements, like a well-
defined anti-Castro faction, are not yet present. Potential leaders may be building contacts 
and organizing networks that would serve as a new foundation, but their radius of action and 
the obstacles confronting them are so large. And so the critical mass necessary for even 
minor breakthroughs cannot take shape. Individual acts of courage and defiance do not 




Further, without change from the middle or upper-middle ranks, the system can stave off 
collapse and contain dangerous penetrations. 
Most Cubans have experienced neither capitalism nor the hardest years of the 
revolution. Their culture, like their ideology, is a result of the new social relations brought 
about by the revolutionary process. As a consequence, state protection of individual and 
community rights, access to social life and work, and the opportunity for individual 
participation- in short, the elements of this new "civility" that are in fact the basis of social 
life in general - are incorporated into the fabric of their political culture. 138 These elements 
are social values reinforced by ideology. 
One notion that individuals acquired as part of their understanding of the revolution 
was reflected in their idea of work. Most Cubans take it for granted that, whatever the 
country's economic situation, all citizens will be guaranteed a job. Consequently, notions of 
a fixed income, social security and the satisfaction of basic necessities have become part of 
the expectations of daily life. 139 Ideologically, the most conspicuous component of the 
revolutionary political culture is equality. This is the notion that the regime will provide all 
public services to the whole population either free of charge or at subsidized rates, and equal 
access to basic consumer foods. These values are essential to political consensus, but at the 
same time inequalities persist as a result of occupational, regional or urban-rural differences. 
Two final ideological components are national defense and internationalism. Revolution 
138Rafael Hernandez and Haroldo Dilla, "Political Culture and Popular 
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intensifies feelings of nationalism and patriotism. Additionally, the United States' policy 
toward Cuba has also contributed to the identification of national defense as a priority. In 
that national defense is a part of evety day life, Cubans are conditioned to expect a new crisis 
with the United States as the tensions between the two nations reinvent themselves anew with 
changes in the international environment and U.S. foreign policy. 
D. U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 
This section attempts to understand to what degree U.S. foreign policy acts as an 
agent of regime change in Cuba. The final hypothesis to be tested is: the more U.S. foreign 
policy (inadvertently) supports a communist regime, the greater the likelihood that 
communism will survive. One central clue to understanding this hypothesis is the recognition 
that the stated foreign policy objectives and the ends the policy achieves are not congruent. 
Specifically, in the case of Cuba, the stated U.S. foreign policy aim since the Cuban 
Revolution of 1959 has been to end communist rule under Fidel Castro. Because this goal 
has eluded the United States for 37 years, perhaps the means of bringing about regime 
transition in Cuba, namely confrontation with the Cuban regime, does not support the desired 
end: regime transition. 
After the interventionist period (direct militaty) in U.S. -Cuban relations ended in the 
early 1930s, Washington began instead to rely increasingly on the Cuban presidents to 
mediate tensions between nationalism and promote United States interests. Public corruption 
and the lack of real political power in semi-sovereign Cuba reinforced the tradition of using 
public office for personal gain and brought to office governments like the Autentico 
administrations, that wasted Cuban assets in ineffectual nationalistic rhetoric and a legacy of 
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unprecedented corruption. From this era of corruption emerged Fulgencio Batista who broke 
constitutional order by overthrowing President Carlos Prio Socarnis just prior to the 1952 
national elections. 140 
United States relations with Batista turned out to be more amicable than those it had 
had with the previous Autentico presidents. Batista met a long-standing United States desire 
by breaking relations with the Soviet Union- which he himselfhad established in 1942. He 
went further and outlawed the Cuban Communist Party. He created more favorable 
conditions for foreign capital and oversaw a significant increase in United States investments 
and tourism.141 Ties between the United States and Cuba were further strengthened in this 
period as Washington grew more concerned about the question of "hemispheric defense." 
The rise and fall of the Batista dictatorship coincided with the first Eisenhower 
administration (1953-1956) in Washington and also with slow changes in United States 
policy toward Latin America that eventually affected relations with Havana. Eisenhower and 
his advisers retained the Cold- War perspective on foreign policy that they had inherited from 
the Truman era often furthering that policy with notions of rolling back communism instead 
of merely containing it. 142 Well into the second Eisenhower term, the principal theaters of the 
Cold War were in Europe and Asia. Latin America was considered reasonably secure from 
14~arold Molineu, United States Policy Toward Latin America: From Regionalism 
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communist threat. In fact, Washington did not worry much about communism in the 
hemisphere until it discovered the "subversion" of the government of (]uatemala in the early 
1950s. This episode caused only brief alarm because the "infected" regime of Jacobo Arbenz 
was easily dispatched in 1954 with the aid of a new weapon in the United States Cold-War 
arsenal- covert warfare undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 143 With only 
minor damage to the United States' image as defender of freedom, the tainted regime was 
uprooted and the country's communist party destroyed. 
If the United States was able to ease its mind about communist control of a Western 
Hemisphere state, the problems of communism as a strategic and social threat still remained. 
Ever since the late 1940s, the CIA had warned the White House of two special dangers from 
communism in Latin America. The first was that in a war with the Soviet Union, Latin 
American communists could attempt to sabotage the flow of strategic materials moving north 
to the United States. The real concern, however, was the second theme of the intelligence 
reports: that communist movements would take advantage of the social tensions and political 
instability in Latin America to threaten United States interests. 144 The problem was that to 
have an effective policy in Latin America the United States had to find an effective antidote 
to anti-Americanism and economic nationalism. As the overthrow of Arbenz indicated, the 
Eisenhower administration was willing to make the shift from military to covert actions to 
protect American interests in Latin America and to stem the tide of anti-Americanism. 




discourage statist economics while encouraging regimes that protected American investments. 
By the late 1950s, the rising tide of hemisphere economic nationalism and anti-
American sentiment, the Soviet "economic offensive," and the domestic criticisms of coziness 
with dictators all combined to place the United States in an uncharacteristically defensive 
posture concerning developments in Latin America.145 As a result, when threats mounted 
against the regime ofFulgencio Batista, the State Department worked to wrestle the United 
States from its entanglement with the dictator. This was no easy task because of the 
American belief that whatever Batista's difficulties with the Cuban people, he represented 
greater stability than would exist in his absence. 
United States officials were able to see the opportunities as well as the dangers in 
Batista's decline. The restoration of constitutional law and civil liberties and the end of a 
military insurrection that by the fall of 1958 was having a devastating effect on United States 
economic interests were promising prospects. 146 Still, there remained the practical questions 
of how Batista might be removed and how the United States could influence the choice of his 
successor. 
As Washington judgements of Castro ranged from moderately to decidedly negative, 
there was a growing consensus that he would most likely be Batista's successor unless the 
United States intervened and arranged for a more acceptable replacement. The attempt to 
create such an alternative and to prepare the way for Batista to step down was slow because 




Treasury Departments - which thought in terms of protecting United States investments 
which Batista had defended. Batista was seen as a loyal and effective _cold warrior who had 
defended the island against communism, maintained stability on the island and cooperated 
with the United States in its business endeavors. 147 
Only at the last minute, it seemed, did the United States recognize the seriousness of 
the Cuban problem and Castro's challenge to Batista's regime. As difficult as the situation 
appeared, no one in Washington seemed to have realized that the end was near. Batista's 
sudden departure on January 1, 1959 effectively ended the search for an acceptable third 
alternative to take over in Cuba. Although the end of the Batista era was disturbing to the 
United States government, still, the most fundamental North American belief- that the 
structure ofthe relationship with Cuba could not be broken- remained initially unshaken. 148 
Certain that the United States economic presence in Cuba was both beneficial and essential 
and that each past government of the island had accepted this, nothing more serious than 
renewed bargaining over the protection of United States interests was expected. 149 
However, this was not the case, as much of Castro's support had come from segments 
of the anti-Batista movement that Washington had not favored and over which it did not have 
anything approaching its usual influence. Castro's removal of those opposed to the 
communists- President Manuel Urrutia and Huber Matos, a veteran and hero of the Sierra 





an increase in communist influence in Cuba. Eventually, Castro began to take the position 
that attacks on communists in Cuba were tantamount to attacks on the Revolution itself. 
Anti-communism became anti-nationalism - a connection facilitated by Batista's adoption of 
North American-style McCarthyism during the 1950s.150 At this point it appears that Castro 
had already decided that an eventual showdown with the United States was inevitable and 
used the communist party as a vehicle for an opening with the Soviet Union, the only possible 
counterweight to the United States. 
The most explicit definition of the strategic role of Cuba came in the 1962 missile 
crisis, but the continuing propensity for United States policy makers to see Cuba as a key 
player in the struggle between the great powers was also important. 151 The Cuban missile 
crisis developed in October 1962, when United States officials discovered that the Soviet 
Union was in the process of installing, in Cuba, medium- and long- range missiles with nuclear 
warheads. The Kennedy administration, 4eciding that the missiles had to be removed, 
imposed a naval blockade around Cuba and issued an ultimatum to Soviet Premier Nikita 
Khrushchev that declared that any missiles fired from Cuba would be considered as having 
come directly from the Soviet Union. After thirteen days of tension in which the world was 
placed on the brink of nuclear war, Khrushchev agreed to dismantle and remove the missiles. 
In the deal reached by the two nations, the Soviet Union would remove the missiles if the 
United States would pledge neither to invade Cuba nor to allow others to attack. Castro was 




and at being left subject to the United States "no invasion" promise at a time when Cuban 
paranoia of an impending United States invasion was at its highest. 
For the United States, the missile crisis provided an opportunity to discredit the Cuban 
revolution. Clearly, it was argued, Castro was in power only because of Soviet props. He 
had betrayed the revolution's quest for independence. Cuba was no better in 1962 than it was 
in 1958. Castro was a Soviet puppet, Cuba, a Soviet satellite state. This was certainly no 
model for the rest of the hemisphere to follow. This argument may have had some short-term 
benefits, but Castro survived 1962, and his revolution still represented, in Latin America, an 
envied symbol of defiance. 152 
In that United States' security was a function of politics around the globe, not 
confined to one region or country, Latin America was just another place, albeit a special one, 
where the battle was fought. Enemies in this hemisphere were a definite problem, but 
communist enemies in particular were not to be tolerated because (1) they were communist, 
and (2) communists were sympathetic to the Soviet Union. 153 These two foreign policy 
considerations left no room for challenge, yet that is exactly what Castro did by becoming a 
client state of the Soviet Union. The United States found itself faced with two major 
adversaries embodied in one Cuban government: (1) a Soviet client state and communist ally; 
and (2) a troublesome neighbor whose independence flouted United States hegemony. 154 





becoming a Soviet client state - which combined hardened the United States' hostility toward 
the Cuban government under Castro. 
Thus, despite the demise of the Soviet Union, there is still some life in the anti-
communist project, demonstrating that anti-communism and anti-Sovietism are not 
completely synonymous. There may no longer be a need or justification for the latter, but 
anti-communism can still survive as a separate issue.155 Since the "threat" from Cuba no 
longer exists, Castro's most strident opponents are rejuvenated and ready to deliver the coup 
de grace to his regime. Thus the anti-communist ideology maintains its legitimacy in this 




IV. COMPARISON OF COUNTRIES 
This work examines Cuban communism in the post-Cold War era. The question to 
be answered is: how viable is communism in Cuba now that communism in the former Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe has failed? The aim of this work thus far has been to test the four 
hypotheses to determine their effects on regime transition in Cuba, and comparatively in 
Poland and China. The hypotheses are as follows: (1) the greater the legitimacy of the 
regime, the greater the chance of regime survival; (2) the greater the ability of a regime to 
transform its economy, the greater the chance of regime survival; (3) the more developed the 
civil society, the greater the likelihood that civil society will oppose the regime; and ( 4) the 
more United States foreign policy (inadvertently) supports a communist regime, the greater 
the likelihood that communism will survive. This chapter will compare communism in Cuba 
with communism in Poland and China to try to isolate variables that contribute to the survival 
of communism in Cuba. The following table depicts the four variables that have been tested 


























A. REGIME LEGITIMACY 
East Europeans did not voluntarily adopt socialism after careful examination of its 
possible advantages and pitfalls. Stalin imposed his communist vision on Eastern Europe with 
deadly force, perhaps explaining the thoroughness with which the bulk of Eastern Europe 
changed in less than a decade from the end of World War II until Stalin's death. It is the 
communism of the Stalinist strain that could have created such a transformation in such a 
short time. 
The new East European regimes swept aside private property, wiped out the middle 
class, collectivized agriculture, brought millions of country people to work in the city, 
dramatically increased the number of working women, brought entirely new people to power, 
reorganized and repopulated all levels of government, created new systems of education and 
scholarship, eliminated freedom of expression, turned East European trade away from its 
natural partnership with Western Europe toward the Soviet Union, propagated a new public 
ethic, built a strong military, and, in general, seized control of all aspects of public life. 156 
Also in Eastern Europe, particularly in the Soviet Union, Stalin developed the "cult 
of personality'' after World War II, and for a short time his charisma unified the Soviet bloc. 
This short-lived period was soon replaced by Khrushchev's revelations about Stalin's 
murderous actions and his public denouncement of Stalin. This de-characterization of Stalin, 
among other things, led to a general de-legitimation of the Communist Party itself An 
analogous process occurred in China, but the effects were much more dramatic than in 
156Byrnes, 8. 
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Eastern Europe. Mao Zedong had been a genuine charismatic leader who, in the minds of 
many Chinese, was deified. Therefore Mao's fall from grace wasgreater in scope than 
Stalin's. The Chinese Communist revolution under Mao Zedong achieved a tremendous 
victory in conquering the Chinese Nationalists (Guomindang) and taking control of one of the 
largest countries in the world. Mao came to symbolize the Chinese revolution and until his 
death legitimized the Communist regime. 157 
From a comparative perspective, what is strikiag about the histories of Cuban and 
Chinese communism is that a charismatic leader (like Lenin) fostering a cult of the personality 
(like Stalin) tried to industrialize the country through a form of state planning that denounced 
the market while mobilizing the agrarian sector (as in China), under the leadership of a single 
dictator whose control over the party was, for the most part, absolute. Unlike in Poland, 
China and Cuba each tried to create a "new socialist man" in the course of industrialization 
and relied on a highly ideological campaign of popular mobilization to do so.
158 
Here the differences with the Stalin model in Poland may perhaps be best explained 
by the Chinese Communist party's long and close connection with the rural population; by the 
lack of a powerful party in Cuba until 197 5; and by the fact that Mao and Castro were not 
only the fathers of their country's revolutions but also the authors of the ambitious 
development plans that in Poland were the product of a leader far less secure in his authority 
157Lucien W. Pye, "Tiananmen and Chinese Political Culture, " Asian Survey, 30, 
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over the people. 159 Even today, after 3 7 years of rule, Castro's authority is essentially 
unopposed in Cuba despite severe economic conditions and tremen~ous external political 
pressures. 
B. ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION 
In Poland, the communists' attempt at partial economic reforms taken in the final 
years of the communist regime dismantled much of the central planning apparatus and allowed 
a small private sector to begin to develop. The reforms failed, however, because they were 
too cautious in creating a real market environment, and because they were generally hostile 
to a real privatization of the economy. 160 The regime was also deeply illegitimate, and this 
represented a fundamental constraint on reforms. The government could not appeal to the 
public for restraint, patience, and trust - key elements in any successful reform program. 161 
China's present economic boom began with the reforms initiated in 1978, and since 
that time the Chinese economy has experienced real annual growth averaging about 9 percent. 
The sheer speed of the growth is staggering. According to economists, if China enjoys 
political stability, and if the global trading system remains open to its exports, China could 
experience 7 or 8 percent annual growth rates into the next century. Yet economists are also 
predicting that the economy will have to slow down as diminishing returns are likely to set 
in eventually as the economy becomes more efficient and sophisticated. One of the great 





growth affect the political realm? Because uneven development has dramatically widened the 
economic gap, the socioeconomic implications could threaten the stability of the regime. 
Further a strong economic sector relatively independent of the state has been established in 
China, one with its own laws and relative freedom from state intervention. According to 
Huntington, with the expansion of the middle class comes the demand for democratization. 
This does not mean that China's economy is slipping wholly out of the control of the current 
regime. The 1989 crackdown of the pro-democracy movement in Tiananmen Square speaks 
to this truth. The crackdown in 1989 notwithstanding, China's door once opened cannot be 
closed. 
Cuba's economic reforms, on the other hand, have flirted around the margins of 
marketization because the current regime, mindful of the unintended adverse consequences 
of market reforms in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, is hesitant to make 
significant structural changes. There are some instances where Cuba has opened its economy 
to the private sector, but again Cuban leaders are wary of the destructive snowball effect as 
the private sector demands increasing inputs, accumulates wealth and presents a frontal 
challenge to the state. Further, a necessary condition for Cuba's reintegration into the 
capitalist market is export diversification. But the potential for significant expansion of 
exports is limited because of the United States embargo and natural and technical 
impediments - lack of advanced technology, poor quality of Cuban ore and fuel shortage. 
Finally, the survival of communism as an economic and political system in either Cuba 
or China, is more promising in the former than the latter. In order for communism in Cuba 
and China to end, both countries must undergo three necessary (but not necessarily 
79 
complementary) processes: (1) the breakdown of the current communist totalitarian regime, 
(2) the introduction and installation of a democratic system, and (3) the consolidation of this 
new system. As Huntington has observed, however, one process of democratization does not 
necessarily lead to the next one. The breakdown of totalitarianism often leads to an 
authoritarian rather than a democratic regime. In setting itself free from the constraints of 
communist ideology, China has arguably already moved from totalitarianism to 
authoritarianism. 
This work focused on the economic performance of the three countries as a causal 
factor leading to the breakdown of the current Communist totalitarian regime, recognizing 
that the economic performance can lead to favorable or unfavorable outcomes in either 
country. According to Robert Dahl in Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, 162 as 
countries with hegemonic (or totalitarian) systems move to high levels of economic 
development a centrally dominated social order is increasingly difficult to maintain. Further, 
economic development itself generates the conditions of a pluralistic social order. The more 
a regime succeeds in transforming the economy (and with it, inevitably, the society) the more 
it is threatened with political failure. Thus because Cuba has not significantly transformed 
its economy as China has, communism is more likely to survive in Cuba than in China. 
C. CIVIT.., SOCIETY 
Even the crudest totalitarian system requires a certain amount of societal participation. 
Such systems thrive on political passivity, but they also need a certain amount of participation, 
162Robert Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1971), 1-11. 
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even in fictional forms such as voting in 'elections' designed to foster the appearance of 
democratic legitimacy. Moral resistance, though seemingly hopeless against systems that are 
based on political and military force, functions like a grain of sand in the cogwheels of a vast 
but vulnerable machine. 163 The reinvigoration of the civil society in Poland - even one that 
avoided overtly political activities in favor of participation in social activities, education, an 
underground press, the exchange of information and opinion - had enormous anti-totalitarian 
power. 
The first step in the self-liberation of civil society in Poland was the successful 
implementation of an oppositional, rather than a dissident, resistance strategy in response to 
the crushing of the strike movement of 1976. The most important social actor in the creation 
of this opposition was the workers union which led to the foundation of other organizations 
that together contested state policy.164 The workers' party foundation and practice was the 
linchpin that reinvigorated Polish civil society, inspiring others in Poland to not only to 
contest state policy but also to form organizations and to participate in society in any form. 
This move from dissent to opposition created the public space that civil society came to 
occupy. 
For China, the 1989 Tiananmen Square student protest movement can be best 
understood as the expression of a fundamental conflict between an authoritarian state and an 
emerging civil society. Further, the diffusion of state power created considerable space for 
163Bronislaw Geremek, "Problems ofPostcommunism: Civil Society Then and 
Now," Journal ofDemocracy, 3, no. 2 (April1992): 4. 
164Bernhard, 10. 
81 
a more autonomous civil society to emerge. The changing nature of the Chinese economy 
and society mean that the Chinese state must look for new ways t() govern because as it 
stands now the three entities are moving toward another collision which may or may not be 
resolved with the authoritarian state at the helm. 
The changes in the Cuban economy, civil society and the state are such that the latter 
remains in firm control of the two former entities. The actions of the students who organized 
and participated in the Tiananmen Square protest movement could not be duplicated in Cuba 
simply because the opportunity to meet, plan and organize at the mass level is small. The 
swift Cuban government response to the members and leaders of Concilio Cubano - an 
umbrella organization of small opposition groups in Cuba which had planned to hold its first 
convention the weekend (24 February 1996) that Cuban MiGs shot down unarmed civilian 
aircraft - speak to this truth. 
The evolution of Cuban political culture and civil society under the strong and 
lingering impact of the Cuban Revolution has essentially drained much of the society's ability 
to fight to exercise participatory democracy and popular power in Cuba. The Cuban citizenry 
has a political culture born of the country's singular historical experience which has been 
manipulated and refined over the last three decades by the Cuban Revolution. In Cuba, small 
violent outbreaks of political protest do occur. But unlike the Tiananmen Square protest 
movement, they have been rapidly quelled. And this swift action by the state security forces 
seems to be enough to dissuade, at least for a time, further protests :from occurring. 
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D. U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 
U.S. foreign policy in Poland before 1956 was based upon th~ hope that nationalist 
breakaways from the Warsaw Pact on the model of Tito's Yugoslavia would undermine 
Soviet hegemony. After the Prague Spring in August of 1968 the emphasis shifted to change 
with the consent - however grudgingly - of the Soviet Union rather than against its will. 165 
Within the broad framework of a policy of differentiation aimed at gradual transformation of 
Soviet imperial control, the short-term objectives of U.S. foreign policy was largely based 
upon economics and security. That is especially the case with economic concessions and 
sanctions. Between 1982 and 1987 the step-by-step lifting of economic sanctions against 
Poland was related to specific measures of domestic liberalization. The detailed programming 
of visits of high-ranking dignitaries was also a method of signaling support to regimes or 
peoples or both. 166 Currently, Poland is a critical element in U.S. calculations about post-
Cold War order in Europe. As a state that wants to join the security alliance of the West or 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Poland is a critical geographic bridge or 
bulwark in the security architecture of the new Europe. Thus NATO expansion to include 
Poland has become- at the U.S.' initiative- a question of"not if, but when."167 
The highpoint in China's relations with the United States came in 1994 with President 
Clinton's decision to "de-link" China's most-favored-nation (MFN) trading status from its 
165Ibid., 78. 
166Ibid., 91. 
167Sherman W. Garnett, "Poland: Bulwark or Bridge?'' Foreign Policy, no. I 02 
(Spring 1996): 66. 
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human rights conditions. On that basis there was a substantial improvement in U.S.-China 
relations. China made no major concessions at all on human rights. In fact, the U.S. State 
Department's 1994 annual human rights report painted a grim picture of human rights in 
China and the PRC deemed the report interference in its internal affairs. Notwithstanding the 
bleak prognosis on the improvement of human rights in China, the U.S. strategy toward China 
has been multifaceted, and while human rights remain important, it was one of a number of 
goals the United States has in its foreign policy with China. Engagement on a series of fronts 
from trade issues to the situation on the Korean and Taiwanese Peninsulas now dominate 
U.S.-China relations. 
The United States has huge stakes in the political transition of China. By remaining 
engaged in the region and rejecting Cold War-style containment strategies toward China, the 
United States hopes to improve the odds that China's next generation of leaders will be more 
moderate and less ideologically driven. As the differences between Deng Xiaoping and Mao 
Zedong make clear, leadership matters, especially in nondemocratic countries. 168 The MFN 
decision reveals that economic interests now weigh more heavily in the balance of U.S. 
foreign policy decision-making. At the same time, China's economic and international power 
is growing and, as this occurs, China's effects on global economic, security, environmental 
and other systems will increase. 169 By engaging China and encouraging its participation in 
regional and international forums, over the long term the U.S. foreign policy seeks to affect 
168David M. Lampton, "America's China Policy in the Age of the Finance Minister: 
Clinton Ends Linkage," The China Quarterly, no. 139 (September 1994): 622. 
169Ibid., 626. 
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China's political transition which the United States hopes will occur as a result of the 




Those who continue to predict Castro's fall from power have a compelling moral 
reason for wishing for the collapse of a totalitarian regime: they regard it as oppressive and 
unjust. Analyzing why the communist regime in Cuba survives is helpful in that it draws 
attention to the interplay between the inner workings of the communism in Cuba and the 
effects of U.S. policy toward Cuba as it relates to Castro's ability to remain in power. By 
way of explanation, predictions regarding Castro's imminent fall have been less ardent in the 
last two years after the regime's survival of the 1992-1993 "special period in time of peace." 
The predictions have failed to materialize largely because they have relied on inexact 
interpretations of events in Eastern Europe and China and because they have failed to take 
into account certain aspects regarding the internal dynamics of the Cuban political system.
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One of those political realities is that, as the history of the modern state suggests, 
with few exceptions national political leaders overall have enormous staying power. Such 
' 
power is magnified when leaders exercise an authoritarian style ofleadership, more so when 
their style is accompanied by a totalitarian political system that reaches into the innermost 
aspects of people's social, economic and personal lives. 171 The following examples in history 
are instructive: the authoritarian models like Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua or the Duvalier 
regimes that remained in power for years in Haiti or Sad dam Hussein, whose country's 
1701. Richard Planas, "Why Does Castro Survive?" World Affairs, 154, no. 3 
(Winter 1992): 87. 
171lbid., 87. 
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economy has experienced a greater economic decline and more political turmoil than Cuba. 172 
Castro's ability to remain in power through one of the most turbulent times in Cuban 
history when the Soviet Union collapsed and stopped the massive economic subsidies suggest 
that there are insufficient grounds to be too optimistic about the demise of the communist 
regime because Castro is not yet confronting any of these situations and because he is more 
clever at transforming his regime to meet the demands of the day. 
Further, predictions about the collapse of unjust political regimes seem to indicate an 
overemphasis on the role of the masses who spontaneously rise up in protest to overthrow 
a tyrannicalleader. 173 An understanding ofwhy men rebel or conversely why men do not 
rebel has to be linked to an understanding of internal and external causes leading to such 
action. Historical popular uprisings, such as the one that led to the dethronement ofLouis 
XVI, or the Bolshevik revolt against the czar, suggest that a minimum degree of freedom of 
expression, communication, and association are needed for the masses to be able to spearhead 
a revolution or a counterrevolution. Otherwise, the spontaneous convergence of thousands 
of unorganized, driven-to-despair individuals into a unified force of opposition at a specific 
point in time, and strong enough to topple a totalitarian regime, is not a social phenomenon 
that occurs easily. This act requires the coalescing of various elements - not the least of 
which is overcoming · fear - within people totally unrelated and without previous 





The demise of communism in Eastern Europe is instructional. In these countries 
neither the masses not the military brought down communism, and none of the regimes, with 
the possible exception of the Soviet Union, collapsed due to military or economic pressure. 
In all cases, including Romania, the civilian leadership failed to prevent the spread of public 
demonstrations at the outset, something that was perceived by the masses as a sign of 
weakness on the part of the regimes. The masses took only the space that was conceded to 
them by weakened and tired bureaucratic leaders who lacked enough determination to do 
what the Chinese did in order to safeguard their system. 175 
Thus by relying on a historically weak thesis that expects too much of the spontaneous 
capability of the masses, some people misinterpret the lessons of Eastern Europe. On that 
basis they recommend measures or make statements hoping to see the events that took place 
in Eastern Europe duplicated in Cuba. Unfortunately, in Cuba the possibility to meet, plan, 
and organize at the mass level is very small. And when a heroic political dissident comes 
along and tries to gain political space within the regime, Castro's resorting to "spontaneous" 
acts of repudiation by the masses or swift action by the state security tends to be enough to 
dissuade others from joining the protests. 176 
In explaining why the communist regime remains in Cuba, nowhere is Castro's 
political ability demonstrated better than in how he presently manages the regime. The 
regime's frontline defense- that which makes the system an efficient one in preventing the 




armed forces, or the party, or any of the mass organizations. Its first line of defense is a by-
product of the system itself and is that which provides Castro ~th its legitimacy: the 
individual's belief in the revolution which translates into their corresponding need to 
stimulate; that is, her or his need to feign loyalty and adherence to the revolution's policies 
as a means of survival. Simulation makes it difficult for any meaningful latent opposition to 
organize because, to a large extent, it is not easy for those who silently oppose the regime to 
identify with each other. Thus while the system may have failed at fostering the attitudes of 
the new man, insofar as fear prevails, it does what Castro wants it to do: it fosters conformity 
amongst the masses; it fosters external acquiescence to revolutionary behavior. 177 
After the Soviet subsidies stopped, Cuba was on the brink of economic collapse in 
1992 and 1993. During "the special period in time of peace," there were power outages in 
Havana because the regime could not come up with the money to buy emergency fuel 
supplies. 178 At this point there was no serious prospect of economic improvement unless 
major changes were made. Castro demonstrated that he is not so rigid and dogmatic that he 
would forgo change when change was necessary to save his regime. When backed into a 
corner Castro decided to transform the Cuban economy toward freer markets. This ability to 
adjust to circumstances helps explain the regime's durability. Although some of the transition 
to freer markets has occurred within the framework of the formal economy, a significant 
cornerstone of this transition is the regime's welcoming of private foreign investment. 
One of Castro's first steps in refashioning the Cuban economy was the vast expansion 
177Ibid., 89. 
178Rieff. 64 , . 
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of the tourism industry. Tourism has replaced sugar as the island's principal hard currency 
earner. In 1993, Castro permitted Cubans to own and spend dollars and hold dollar-
denominated bank accounts. He also authorized self-employment in some 1 00 occupations. 
The next step, in September 1994, was the reestablishment of farmers' markets. After 
meeting their contracts with state enterprises, farmers now may sell their surplus production 
for whatever the market will bear. Since December 1994 citizens have been allowed to sell 
handicrafts and a variety of light manufactures in artisan markets. 179 
Foreign investment has also been key to Cuba's economic transformation. The new 
influx of capital has been augmented by the foreign investment law enacted in mid-1995 which 
makes it possible for foreign investors to own Cuban enterprises outright, not just in tourism 
but in virtually every area of the economy. 18° Figures are difficult to come by but an estimate 
by the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council places foreign investment to date at over $5 
billion and growing. This is a respectable amount, but not nearly enough to complete the 
economic transformation Cuba needs. 181 Thus the economic transformation in Cuba continues 
along the same model as in China but on a smaller, less successful scale. Cuba is still not out 
of the economic woods, but the regime has demonstrated its ability to transform the economy 
enough to survive. 
Political change often accompanies economic reforms. Cubans are mindful of the 





socioeconomic changes taking place in Eastern Europe and Russia, and have vowed that 
Cuba will not allow the economic transformation process to get out ofhand. Cuban officials 
argue that the midst of an economic crisis is not the time for political experimentation. Some 
go even further and see Cuba following a Chinese model of reform, which allows significant 
economic liberalization but minimal political change. 182 Such a model may be appropriate 
for Cuba's situation today, but it is not likely to remain so over the long run. China is a huge 
country with oil, coal, and other natural resources and a domestic market so large it is almost 
irresistible to international business. 
Further, China can be self-sufficient to a degree that Cuba cannot, and is therefore less 
vulnerable to external pressures. To reinsert itself into the international economic community, 
Cuba must make more concessions and adjustments than China. China has little pressure for 
political liberalization from its Asian neighbors, the United States, or Europe. This is not the 
case for Cuba.183 For example, a U.S. law, Helms-Burton, seeks to punish third party nations 
that trade with Cuba, while another U.S. provision, Most-Favored Nation status, significantly 
encourages U.S. trade with China while not punishing other nations that do likewise. 
In spite ofhis enthusiastic comments about what he saw on his November 1995 visit 
to China, Castro's heart is not in economic liberalization, let alone political reform. The 
regime has simply done what it must to survive, and increasingly, survival is its only 
discernible goal. If evidence were needed that the revolution is over, the obsession with 




every day on the U.S. currency and the world economic system in which the United States 
is dominant. Without American backing for loans from the International Monetary Fund and 
the World Bank, Cuba's economic destiny is likely to resemble that of its Caribbean 
neighbors. But the Castro regime is locked in the world that existed when Fidel and Che were 
in the Sierra Maestra, a world in which the economy was not yet global and geopolitics, rather 
than geoeconomics, was the essence of international relations. 184 
As stated earlier, in 1992, during the deep economic crisis of "the special period in 
time of peace," the U.S. Congress approved the Cuban Democracy Act. A familiar idea 
behind the law was the concept of civil society in which economic reforms by a totalitarian 
state lead ineluctably to political reforms and, eventually, a market democracy. The measure 
declared that "the fall of Communism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe ... 
provides the United States and the international democratic community with an 
unprecedented opportunity to promote a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba."
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Passage of the measure coincided with the recognition in Havana that even successful 
macroeconomic development would not deliver soon enough to provide for people's basic 
material needs. Hence the decision to legalize the dollar, but by last year the regime sensed 
that that trend was getting out of hand. Dissidence, while still relatively minor, was on the 
rise. In addition, Castro, forced to grant the Roman Catholic Church in Cuba some freedom 




about its reinvigoration.186 Although the bill was promoted as a tightening of the 1961 
embargo, some of the bill's provisions liberalized telecommunications links and called for 
"assistance, through appropriate nongovernmental organizations, for the support of 
individuals and organizations to promote nonviolent democratic change in Cuba."187 This 
line, taken up by Richard A. Nuccio, the former special advisor to the president on Cuban 
matters, aimed at encouraging humanitarian relief organizations and human rights groups to 
step up their activities in Cuba and was seen as a major change in governmental policy. 188 
The Clinton administration's emphasis on what was called a Track II approach 
alarmed the Castro regime more than the original passage of the measure. If the U.S. 
government turned its attention from supporting the heroic but largely impotent dissident 
movement to overtly or covertly sponsoring or even just actively encouraging the activities 
of nongovernmental humanitarian organizations, the regime might find itself faced with 
powerful opposing forces. 189 The Cuban leader's reaction to this new treatment of Cuba was 
the dramatic 24 February 1996 shootdown of the two civilian Cessnas ofU.S. registry that 
had allegedly violated Cuban airspace. 
The Brothers to the Rescue planes had overflown Havana in July 1995 and dropped 
leaflets over the capital in January 1996. Cuba's attack on the two planes the following 






situation with the United States for a while. Or, in National Assembly President Ricardo 
Alarcon's phrase, the exile group might have delivered a rationale for a new government 
campaign of ideological mobilization "on a silver platter."190 Whatever the case, using what 
it termed as aggression against Cuba as a pretext, the regime intensified a crackdown against 
not only dissidents but also advocates of political and economic liberalization thereby closing 
off the minuscule space for an opposition to form. 191 
Two weeks after the planes were shot down, Congress approved the Helms-Burton 
bill, which further tightened the embargo against Cuba. Whatever its merits, the measure had 
the unintended effect of halting Track II initiatives under way or in the planning stages. While 
the revolution is arguably over, the Castro regime is not on the verge of collapse. Unlike 
Helms-Burton, the Cuban Democracy measure took Castro's durability into account: Track 
II was about building pressure for reform. The current law will severely restrict the freedom 
of maneuver for groups or institutions that want to oppose the Castro regime. And Helms-
Burton gives the power to lift the sanctions against Cuba to a Congress with nothing to gain 
and much to lose from changing a single provision, taking it away from a president who, at 
least in a second term, might have dared to modify it or go to Havana as Nixon did in China 
and Poland in 1972. 
The economic transformation in Cuba has allowed the regime to survive the fall of the 
Soviet Union and with it the ending of the economic subsidies. Despite the changes taking 




state to·market mechanisms, and it is even less committed to political reform. Rather, the 
Cuban regime is doing what it must to survive, and increasingly, surviva~ is its only discernible 
goal.I92 
Cuban civil society is underdeveloped, but changes are more promising now than ever 
before since the Catholic Church has begun to call for liberalization. According to Alfred 
Stepan, liberalization refers fundamentally to civil society. 193 With the elevation to cardinal 
of Havana Archbishop Jaime Ortega in November 1994, the Catholic Church has taken on 
a more aggressive role in Cuban society and is showing clear signs of a slow, but steadfast 
resurgence on the island. Cuba's economic turmoil during "the special period in time of 
peace" ( 1992-1993) has changed the church's standing, providing it with a niche the 
government has failed to fill: Hope and the promise ofbetter days ahead.194 
Pope John Paul II, who helped bring about the collapse of Communism in Eastern 
Europe, accepted an invitation on November 19, 1996 to visit Cuba in 1997. A papal visit 
would put the Cuban regime's tolerance to a test, since the Pope has indicated that he will 
make the trip only under the condition that he have access to the Catholics and the freedom 
to travel and to be heard without interference.195 In this way, the Pope will be able to do what 
the U.S. government will not do: engage the Cuban people. 
192Ibid., 71. 
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Finally, after more than three decades of an economic embargo designed to destroy 
the Cuban economy and bring down the Castro regime, Castro still remains defiant. The 
collapse of Cuba's traditional trading markets in the Eastern bloc significantly hurt the Cuban 
economy, but Castro is transforming it enough to keep it alive. The question remains as to 
how long. 
As long as the United States continues its current foreign policy of"squeeze," Castro 
will continue to be able to control civil society with his anti-American rhetoric and 
nationalism. The ''us" against "them" strategy he employs is only successful to the extent that 
United States policy allows it to be. The United States has nothing to lose and everything to 
gain from implementing a communication strategy. The most important thing for the United 
States to do is to stop playing to Castro's strengths and start playing to his weaknesses. Each 
new United States threat gives Castro another opportunity to wrap himself in the Cuban flag 
and appeal to Cubans to do the same in the name of country. Castro has played the "us" 
against "them" confrontation game well. He may not know how to play the communication 
game. He is not accustomed to an informed population with detailed, up-to-date information 
on the benefits of liberal democracy and free-market economy. The sooner the United States 
shifts the game from one Castro plays so well - confrontation - to one he is unaccustomed to 
playing - communication - the more effective the United States foreign policy in Cuba will be. 
The sense that Fidel Castro's days may be numbered focuses its attention on the 
demise of the Soviet Union and on United States foreign policy toward Cuba. The issue is 
not whether the United States should normalize relations with Cuba, but whether it should 
maintain the current policy or modifY it. Supporters of the current policy and those who want 
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to toughen it rejected the notion that Castro's communism was a reaction to United States 
policy and are vindicated by international developments, particularly the ;February 1996 Cuban 
shoot-down of two civilian Cessnas. Supporters of a more open and less confrontational 
policy place the onus for democratization in the hands of the Cuban people and note that a 
communication strategy hinted at in the 1994 Cuban Democracy Act is most likely to 
facilitate that end. This strategy facilitates contact with the American people and refrains 
from provoking repression that will retard the growth of the Cuban opposition. This work 
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